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PROVISIONS OF THE TAX POLICY REVIEW BILL
OF 1972 AFFECTING INDIVIDUAL TAXPAYERS
DAVID C. JOHNSON

Reference to a tax provision as 'preferential' or 'special'
does not connote opposition to the social or economic objective which Congress has used the tax law to support. It does
mean the provision deviates from a norm. Implicit in the
reference is the idea that the income tax has an essential
integrity; that there is a fundamental standard for determining the tax base and the applicable rates; that maintenance of the standard (restorationwhere it has been eroded)
is important to society, high on its scales of values; that
the proponent of a measure which deviates-which creates
a preference-has a burden of proof which goes as much to
the use of the tax system as the means of accomplishment
as to the measure's specific social or economic objective.
Bernard Wolfman 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Interest in the policy aspects of taxation is no longer limited
to tax professionals. The dramatic injection of the tax reform issue
into the 1972 presidential campaign stirred a national debate on
tax preferences. 2 Not since Phillip Stem's best-seller, The Great
Treasury Raid," has there been such interest among taxpayers
about privileges and tax shelters.
Much of this dialogue concerned itself with the income tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. But recognition of growing
financial needs of states and cities, problems of state welfare,
financing public education, taxation of multistate business, and the
*
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1. Wolfman, Federal Tax Policy and the Support of Science, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 171,
173 (1965). Presently, Bernard Wolfman is the Dean of the University of Pennsylvania
School of Law.
2. An example of magazine writings on tax reform is found in SATUIRAY REVIEW,
Oct. 21, 1972, at 45-52, wherein noted personalities, are asked the question "Do Our Tax
Laws Need a Shake-up". As one might expect there is
great diversity between the

views of Ralph Nader (public interest advocate) and Al
to the direction that tax reform should take.
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Capp (cartoonist, lecturer) as

The book held position
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the non-fiction best seller list for the weeks of April 10. 17, 1964. See TIME, April 10, 17,
1964, at 10, 12.
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problem of what is the proper mixture of property and sales taxes,
have aided in making the public more conscious of needed reforms.'
In 1972, in response to this public concern the Joint Economic
Committee issued the following statement in their annual report:
We urge the Administration to provide to the Congress by
this summer detailed evaluations of at least one-third of the
special provisions in the individual and corporate income tax
laws, so that Congress can decide whether the provisions
fairly distribute their benefits and efficiently achieve their

specific objectives .
This report included a study of federal subsidies and tax subsidies.
Such emphasis on tax subsidies encouraged numerous tax reform
bills before the ninety-second Congress.7 And in response to these
demands, Congressman Wilbur D. Mills, Chairman of the House
Ways and Means Committee, and Senator Mike Mansfield, majority
leader of the Senate, introduced on May 31, 1972, the Tax Policy
Review Act of 1972.8 This tax proposal would have required Congress
to comprehensively and systematically, within the next three and
one-half years, review "preferential" tax provisions in the Internal
Revenue Code. Under the bill, fifty-four "preference" items 9 would
4. For a consideration of these broad issues of tax reform where the need for an
interrelationship of state and federal revenues is recognized, see Young, Tax Reform-The Next Stage, 27 TAX L. REv. 247 (1972). The author analyzes the need for funds;
types of federal assistance (direct grants and revenue sharing); and additional revenue
at the federal level, with emphasis on the value added tax.
The activities of Congress In 1972 should not be overlooked in Its role of Increasing
national awareness. See Matsunaga, Recent Tax Trends in Congress, 50 TAXES 683 (1972).
5.

HOUSE COMM. ON

WAYS

AND MEANS,

92d CoNG., 2d SESS.,

REPORT OF THE JOINT

ECONOMIC COMMrTTrE, 39 (Comm. Print 1972).
6. The committee recommended that "Congress act to eliminate enough of the serious
tax loopholes to provide a revenue increase of approximately 10 billion .... " Id.
7. The major ones were: H.R. 11058 to change 38 provisions, sponsored by California Congressman James C. Corman; and H.R. 13877 which would have made 4 major
revisions, sponsored by Wisconsin Congresman Henry S. Reuss.
8. H.R. 15230 and S. 3657, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
9. The provisions are grouped under the bill by termination date. The items are both
business and nonbusiness in nature. Since this article deals with the provisions affecting
individuals, these terms will be italicized.
PROVISIONS TERMINATED ON AND AFTER JANUARY 1, 1974:
- 1. The $30,000 exemption for the minimum tax.
2. The deduction of ordinary income taxes for the minimum tax.
3. The exclusion from gross income of group-term life insurance of employees.
4. The $5,000 death benefit exclusion.
5. The $100 dividend exclusion.
6. The guaranteed business bad debt deduction.
7. The provision permitting assets to be written off over a period 20 percent
shorter than their class lives under the ADR system.
8.- The capital gain treatment of lump-sum distributionfrom pension funds.
9. Qualified stock options.
10. The tax exemption for credit unions and certain mutual insurance funds.
11. Special reserves for losses on bad debts of banks, mutual savings banks, etc.
12. Percentage depletion for oil, gas, and other minerals.
13. Capitalgain for timber, coal and iron or royalties.
14. Exclusion of gross-up on dividends of less developed country corporations.
15. Exclusion of earned Income from foreign sources.
16. The alternate tax on capital gains of corporations and individuals.
17. The recapture rules for real property.
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be eliminated automatically from the tax law over the three year
period, unless Congress voted to retain them.
Although this specific bill will not be re-introduced in 1973, and
Congressman Mills has retreated from the automatic phase-out feature of the bill, the fifty-four preference items will continue to be
targets for reform. 0
18. The special exemptions for excess deductions account for farm losses.
PROVISIONS TERMINATED ON AND AFTER JANUARY 1, 1975:

19.
20.
21.

The exclusion from gross income of sick pay.
The deduction for nonbusiness interest.
The deduction for nonbusiness taxes.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Fast depreciation methods.
The deduction of research and experimental expenditures.
The deduction of soil and water conservation expenditures.
Additional first-year depreciation allowance.
The deduction of expenditures for clearing land.
Amortization of railroad grading and tunnel bores.
The deduction of Intangible drilling and development costs.
The deduction of development expenditures in case of mines.
The exemption of ships under foreign flags.
The special deduction for Western Hemisphere trade corporations.
The exemption of income from sources within possessions of the United
States.
The exclusion from Subpart F of shipping profits and certain dividends and
interest.
The provisions relating to Domestic International Sales Corporations.

33.
34.

035.

Step-up in tax basis of property acquired from a decedent. (Not covered In

the article].
36. Capital gain from the sale or exchange of patents.
PROVISIONS TERMINATED ON AND AFTER JANUARY 1, 1976:
37. The $25,000 corporate surtax exemption.
38. The retirement income credit.
39. The deduction and credit for political contributions.
40. The investment credit.
41. The exclusion for interest on State and local bonds.
42. The exclusion of the rental value of parsonages.
43. The exclusion from gross income of scholarships and fellowships.
44. The exclusion from gross income of gain on sale of residence by person over
65.
45. Additional personal exemptions for the aged and blind.
*46.
The exemption for child where income exceeds $750. [Not covered in the
article].
47. The deduction for nonbusiness casualty losses.
48. The charitable contribution deduction.
49. The medical expense deduction.
50. The child care deduction.
51. The moving expense deduction.
52. Nonrecognition of gain on the use of appreciated property to redeem stock.
53. Nonrecognition of gain in connection with certain liquidations.
54. The deduction for long-term capital gains.
10. In a speech before the Securities Industry Association Management Conference
In New York, Chairman Mills gave his reasons for the change in approach as follows:
Some have misconstrued the purpose of the automatic termination dates...
with the result that their enactment might create uncertainties and undesirable economic effects. . . . I originally scheduled the 54 items because
they lent themselves to an automatic termination procedure. With the deletion of the automatic termination procedure, there is no reason to confine
tre review to the 54 items, and it becomes desirable to expand the scope
of the review to cover many additional items....
See 69 STD. FED. TAX REPTS. no. 46 (1972). In the press release explaning H.R. 15230
Mills states why he does not feel that past reforms have gone far enough:
In 1969 we enacted into law what was clearly the most comprehensive tax
reform measure in our history. That act made over 75 tightening amendments to the tax laws. . . . There were also many significant tax reforms
enacted in 1962 and 1964. Nevertheless, there were many areas In which I,
and others, would have liked to see these acts go further than it was possible to go at those times. ...
See 59 STD. Fs. TAX REFTrS. no. 31, part I (1972).
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The bill is most significant and will continue to have impact
in two respects: isolation of preference items and labeling them as
such, and the automatic phase-out concept. Although tax dispensations have been thought of by scholars as subsidies and preferences,
Congressional labeling first occurred in 1969 when the minimum tax
on tax preferences was added to the Code. 1 But the list of preferences subject to the minimum tax is quite limited, whereas Mills
has isolated fifty-four items. Tax reformers of the future will find
their case easier to make as a result of this "official" recognition.
Secondly, the phase-out feature of the bill was an important innovation in the area of reform. If preference items were subject to
automatic elimination two desirable features would emerge. First,
the subsidy through the tax base would have to be reviewed or it
would disappear. This would then make the indirect subsidy more
like the over-the-board federal appropriation that is reviewed at
regular intervals. This could of course be accomplished without
automatic elimination if the sums federally allocated by tax preferences were reflected in the federal budget and accounts, 12 but even
with such accounting the prospect of termination would encourage
greater focus on the subsidy involved. Second, the phase-out would
have the effect of shifting the burden of proof from the tax reformer
where it now lies to the advocate urging retention of the subsidy.
Not only would he have to make his case for the subsidy, but
he would further have to establish that the income tax is the appropriate vehicle for such relief. In any event the innovation by Mills
provides a possible mechanism for tax reform bills of the future,
and at least suggests to Congress that in adding a new preference
item to the Code some consideration as to a time-limit on the subsidy should be made.
Why is there such pressing need for reform in view of the fact
that the Tax Reform Act of 1969 made seventy-five amendments
to the tax laws?'3 In fact since 1913 there have been approximately
fifty major revenue measures, each of which made important changes
in the tax laws. 14 The Revenue Act of 196415 affected 234 sections
11.
12.

INT. REV. CODE o 1954, §§ 56-58.
See Wolfman supra note 1, at 186. Therein he states:
Finally, the darkness should be lifted. The considerations which permit
our sacrificing some of the integrity of the tax system for the values of
private Initiative and freedom do not also require that we be kept in ignorance ...

13.
14.

See Mill's press release, supra note 10.
Paul, Directions in Which Tax Policy and Law Have Been Moving, 30 TAXEs

949

(1952)
points out that in thirty years between 1913 and 1942 Congress enacted about
forty pages of revenue legislation a year involving nineteen major revenue measures. In
the following ten years Congress enacted ten revenue measures of major importance,
which averaged seventy pages a year. He suggests that comparing this with the 1894
Act, which only required eight ,pages, indicates an alaxming trend.
Hambrick, The Illusion of Tax Refortn, 1963 DuKE L.J. 56, 57, in referring to ap-
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and subsections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and two sections of the 1939 Code.1" All of these measures were "reform"
from someone's points of view.
The explanation for steadfast dissatisfaction with reform efforts
is quite naturally that people disagree sharply with the meaning
of the word "reform." In the next section of this article I will consider generally the conflicting views on tax policy to show how
difficult it is to reach agreement in changing the Internal Revenue
Code, and set the stage for examination of the provisions of the
bill that affect individuals, or perhaps more properly, the nonbusiness items.
II. TAX IDEOLOGIES**
Tax ideologies are the underlying content of our fiscal systemthe intellectual and emotional essence on which it rests. When we
attempt to meditate upon this essence, we are reaching into the
ultimate values and ideals of the system-or, to use a more ponderous phrase, the metaphysics of taxation.
Louis Eisenstein
In looking at the fifty-four items of preference listed by Chairman Mills, it is apparent that our law does not truly tax individuals
on "all income from whatever source derived."' 8 The existence
of exclusions," deductions,20 exemptions and credits,2 1 special treatment for capital gains, 22 and special dispensations,2 3 prevent what

is the ideal of most scholars: a progressive tax applied to all income
2"
of an individual.
Before examining individually how these preference items came
into law, and whether or not they should remain, it is necessary
to inquire into three areas involving tax policy considerations of
a broader nature. First, the politics of taxation: what are the group
proximately thirty revenue acts since 1942 and in considering the then pending legislation (then entitled the Revenue Act of 1963) asks if anything has happened which should
inspire renewed hope that the frustrations which plagued previous efforts have passed
from the scene.
15. Pub. L. No. 88-272, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
16. Amending §§ 43, 925 of the 1939 Code.
**In analyzing writings and tax legislation prior to April of 1964 I borrowed on occasion from my master's thesis, The Revenue Act of 1964 and the Prospects for .Future
Reform, on file in the law library of the University of Pensylvania School of Law.
17. Eisensten, Some Second Thoughts on Tax Ideologgies, N.Y.U. 23RD INST. ON FED.
TAX 1 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Some Second Thoughts].
18.
INT. R3V. COD
OF 1954, § 61 (a).
19. See note 9 supra, items numbered 3, 4, 5, 19, 41, 42, 43, 44,
20. See note 9 supra, items numbered 20, 21, 39, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51.
21. See note 9 supra, items numbered 83, 45, 46.
22. See note 9 supra, items numbered 8, 9, 13, 16, 36, 54.
23. See note 9 supra, items numbered 1, 2, 35.
24. This ideal is the theme of House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess., Tax Revision Compendium of Papers on Broadening the Tax Base, (Comm.
Print 1959).

.4"
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arguments which shape our tax laws and make reform difficult?
In this analysis I shall rely heavily on the works of the late Louis
Eisenstein. Second, what is the proper approach to the elimination
of preferences? Should the entire Code be repealed so we may
start afresh, as urged by the comprehensive tax base advocates,
or should an ad hoc approach be continued, as urged by Professor
Bittker? Third, assuming that a tax dispensation or subsidy is justified from the standpoint of the social good it accomplishes, is the
tax base the proper vehicle for this relief? In this inquiry I shall
be guided by the principles announced by Dean Wolfman.
Although there are many other fruitful lines of inquiry in the
area of tax policy, these three categories-group arguments, comprehensive tax base as an ideal, and the propriety of using the
Code as a vehicle for subsidies-seem to me to be central to
the inquiry of whether or not a preference should be removed.
A.

GROUP ARGUMENTS-THE IDEOLOGIES OF EISENSTEIN

In looking at the problem of specific reforms from the standpoint
of group arguments which shape our tax laws, one is immensely
aided by Louis Eisenstein's book entitled The Ideologies of Taxation.25 He classified his work as
[A]n essay on the intellectual content of an emotional
subject-the distribution of our so-called progressive income
tax among the American people. It is concerned with the
systems of reason and rhetoric which groups and interests
devise in order to26obtain a distribution responsive to their
pecuniary desires.

He subscribed to the oft repeated statement of Dr. T. S. Adams
that
modern taxation or tax-making in its most characteristic
aspect is a group contest in which powerful interests vigorously endeavour to rid themselves of present or proposed
tax burdens. It is, first of all, a hard game in which he who
trusts wholly to economics, reasons, and justice, will in the
disillusioned. Class politics is of the
end retire beaten and
27
essence of taxation.

To Eisenstein "[o]ur taxes reflect a continuing struggle among
contending interests for the privilege of paying the least. ' ' 28 It is
25. L. ESExsTEN,
EIBSNSTEIN].

THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION

(1961)

[hereinafter cited as

at Preface ili.

26.

Id.

27.
28.

Adams, Ideole and Idealism In Taxation, 18 AMES. ECoN. REV.1 (1928).
L. EiBNmN, upra note 25, at 3, 4.

L
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perhaps because people aspire to loftier rationales to justify tax
dispensations, that the outlook for reform is so dim.
Although the book is satirically written, it contains brilliant
analyses, and seems a natural step from other "tax classics."
Earlier writings by Vickrey,2 9 and Simons3 ° spotlighted needed
areas of reform. Eisenstein classifies the arguments that prevent
reform.
His classification involves three major group arguments: the
ideology of ability to pay; the ideology of barriers and deterrents;
and the ideology of equity.3 1 The argument of equity appears to
be more properly a sub-category of each of the other two-a method
of argument for persons of either persuasion-rather than being
in a separate category by itself.

1. The Ideology of Ability to Pay
Since Chairman Mills' list of 54 preferences are primarily items
that benefit businessmen and higher bracket taxpayers, advocates
of this persuasion would be solidly behind him.
Proponents of ability to pay believe in progression in the income
tax; and that a dollar is a dollar regardless of source, whether
capital gains or social security income, and that it should be taxed
accordingly . . . but at a progressive rate. Persons fitting into this
category would be low income classes who benefit from progression,
and liberals who believe in redistribution of income through the
income tax.3 2 Rather than to term it redistribution of income,
however, the liberals have purifie4 progression by arguing that
higher income groups have greater ability to pay. This places
the ideology on shaky ground.
Ability to pay advocates have two difficulties. The first is due
to their justification for progressive taxes: that one is able to pay
a higher percentage of taxes on certain dollars in accord with an
artificial bracketing determined by Congress, s and that this is the
historical reason for a progressive tax. Eisenstein on the other hand
concludes that the income tax was born out of class legislation
which resulted from the failure of the poor to understand why there
should be no tax on savings. 4 But the laborers and the farmers
went further by asking for a redistribution of income. Thus, the
29.
30.

31.
32.

VICNREY, THE AGENDA FOR PROGRnSSrVE TAXATION (1947).
SiMONS, FEDERA.L TAX REFORM (1950).
L. EISENSTEIN, supra note 25, at 13.
But as L. EISENSTEINe in some Second Thouqghts, supra note 17,

indicates

(dis-

cussed further below) the effect of economic arguments has moved liberals into the
bariers and deterrents camp.
33. Progression must not be confused with a flat rate. Whereas a flat rate of 20%
will yield $20 on $100 and $200 on $1,000, a progressive tax extracts an increasing percentage, such as $20 on 100 and $400 on $1,000.
supra note 25, at 18-21.
24. L. EIzSENsTE,
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progressive tax "derived from the pressures of self-interest exerted
against a small minority,"" and as such is founded on a discrimination against savings. This conclusion is supported by the analyses
of Blum and Kalven. 6 Their book, also a "tax classic," suggests
that the only justification for progression is the felt need for economic equity through redistribution of income.
The second difficulty faced by these advocates of ability to pay
is shown in their arguments which accept income-splitting, charitable contributions,and the medical deducation. 87 Once these distinctions have been accepted a dollar is no longer a dollar regardless of source. Dollars given to publicly recognized charities or
given to assist a needy relative in college. This second difficulty
spent for medical purposes are treated differently than dollars
would be cured if advocates admitted that this was a deviation
from ability to pay, but Eisenstein suggested that liberals will not
do this; it would admit that in certain cases the end justifies the
means, and if this is so then the end result may be supplied by
others.8 8
2.

The Ideology of Barriers and Deterrents

This is the opposite of the preceding ideology. Proponents of the
theory of barriers and deterrents oppose progression and high taxes
for three reasons: such taxation dangerously diminishes the desire to
work; it fatally discourages the incentive to invest; and it irreparably
impairs the sources of new capital. "The three precepts merge into a
more general perception of impending diasater." 89 Proponents of this
ideology may be tentatively classed as Republicans, or high income
non-liberals. As will be seen below this is an overly abrupt classification, but in arguing barriers and deterrents, "Republicans are
able to do so with a distinguished monotony that the Democrats
are unable to acquire.' 40 Naturally, advocates of this persuasion
oppose progressive rates. In fact if one opposes progression, he would
tend to favor "loopholes," since such preferences have the effect
of reducing the impact of progressive rates.
Since Eisenstein's book was written in 1961, he could not then
comment on the implications of subsequent revenue acts. He did,
however, in 1964 have second thoughts41 based on the Acts of 1962
35.

36.

Id. at 21.
BLUm & IKALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE POR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1952).

37.

Stanley S.

Surrey is regarded by Eisenstein as a

prime adherent of the ability to

pay. See articles by Surrey, The Federal Tax Base for Individuals, 58 COLUm. L. REV.
815

(1958)

and The Congress and the Taxr Lobbyist-How Special Provisions Get Enacted,

70 HARv. L. Rsv. 1145 (1957).
38.
L. EISENSTEIN, aupra note 25, at 48.
39. Id. at 13.
40. Id. at 67.
41. Eisenstein, Some Second Thoughts, aupra note 17.
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and 1964. He recognized in this article that the barriers and deterrents ideology was picking up numerous Democrats.4 2 This later
piece is much more concerned with the economic aspects of taxation
than was the earlier work.
Whereas, tax policy prior to the sixties emphasized equity and
the need for subsidies through the income tax base, justified to a
large degree by political considerations, the policy of the sixties
concerned itself with economic growth. The Treasury in speaking
of the Revenue Acts of 1962 and 1964 called these laws "tax reform
in the 'economic' sense. ' 43 It is noted that "in the crucible of intense national debate tax and fiscal policy have finally been accorded a positive role in our political and economic system. ' ' 44
An inconsistent administration economic policy is shown when
the Acts of 1962 and 1964 are placed side by side. In the 1962 the
investment credit, a direct stimulant to business was heralded by
the administration as a partial solution to the problem of unemployment through increased economic growth. 45 Whereas in the Revenue
Act of 1964 the administration emphasized the need for additional
consumption as a solution to the employment problem.4 6 A prime
advocate of the barriers and deterrents ideology, Roswell Magill,
confirms this inconsistency. In testifying on the 1963 proposals, he
refers to the investment credit, noting, "apparently, although the
diagnosis remains unchanged, the remedy prescribed has now been
' 47
reversed and the emphasis is on increased consumer spending.
The issue suggested by comparing these two Acts is whether increased real capital formation, and resultant economic growth, will
42.

Id.

at 8.

43. Remarks of the Honorable Henry H. Fowler, then Under Secretary of the Treasury,

at the 14th Ann. Midyear

Conf. of the Tax

Exec. Inst.,

Mayflower

Hotel, Wash.,

D.C., Mar. 2, 1964, under first part entitled "A Turning Point in Tax Policy."
44.

Id.

45.

In order to minimize unemployment, to satisfy the desires of our people for
rising standards of living, to meet our defense and other domestic and international obligations, and to demonstrate the vitality of our free economy,

we must achieve a higher rate of growth. This we cannot do unless we
achieve a more satisfactory rate of capital formation.

Statement of then Secretary of the Treasury, C. Douglas Dillon found in Hearings Before
the Senate Committee on Finance, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1962).
46.

The rationale given by President Kennedy was as follows:

Consumers will
savings into a

convert a major

percentage of their personal

income tax

higher standard of living, benefiting their own families while

generating stronger markets for producers. Even modest increases in takehome pay enable consumers to undertake larger periodic payments on major
purchases, as well as to increase purchases of smaller items-and either
type of purchase leads to further income and employment.

Investment will be expanded, as the rate of return on capital formation is increased, and as growing consumer markets create a need for new
capacity.

It

is

no

contradiction

to

say that

the best means

of increasing

investment today is to increase consumption and market demand-and reductions in. tax individual rates will do this.
Hearings Before the Comm. on Ways and Means on the Tax Recommendations of the
President,88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 8 (1963).
47. Hearings on H.R. 8363 Before the Comm. on Finance, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1371

(1963). For classification of Magil's ideology, see L. EIsENsTEI N, supra mote 25, at 57, 76.
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be better accomplished through the encouragement of consumption
or investment. The question of progression in taxation then be-

comes a problem of tax distribution which will encourage increased
consumption or investment depending on current emphasis.
From the standpoint of the ideologies discussed above, the Revenue Act of 1964, under a Democratic administration, was very favorable to conservatives and a triumph for the advocates of the
ideology of barriers and deterrents. 48 On the other hand, the Tax
Reform Act of 1969,19 under the Republicans, was favorable to the
liberal ideology of ability to pay. Major provisions of this Act incided an increase in the maximum standard deduction, 50 a low52

income allowance,51 and an increase in per capita exemptions.

Taking these measures into account, the Act had the effect of removing 7.6 million returns from the tax roll 5 3 In addition the
Act eliminated the preference given to long-term capital gains in
excess of $50,000,54 and the minimum tax 5 was introduced to deal
directly with high bracket preferences. Also, the concept of a maximum tax became law, which may be a victory of sorts for both
ideologies. Starting in 1972 a fifty per cent ceiling was placed on
50
the marginal tax rate applying to an individual's earned income.
3.

The Ideology of Equity
This dogma is concerned with equality among equals. Instead

48. Although numerous reforms were urged the administration's major concern was
a reduction in rates. See B. NOSSITER, THE MYTHMAKERs 34-36 (1964). Prior to the
Revenue Act of 1964, individual rates ranged from 20 to 91 percent. The Act reduced
rates to 14 to 70 percent. However, in the words of Senator Douglas: "[t]he present tax
system is really loaded against the lower income groups. We delude ourselves if we believe that the rates of progression on the upper federal income taxes are actually paid
by many taxpayers." 110 CONG. REc. 1943 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1964). Hence, the recognition that the wealthy do not really pay taxes at the top level, plus the reduction by
the Act from 91 to 70 percent combined with the reforms that failed to pass forces one
to concede a victory for the ideology of barriers and deterrents.
Although the Revenue Act of 1964 did produce some legislation favorable to the
middle and lower income groups such as the minimum standard deduction, the child
care deduction, income averaging and the employee moving expense deduction Congress
failed to act in major areas favorable to the wealthy: tightening up the tax treatment
in the area of natural resources and the treatmert of capital gains.
49. Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487. [hereinafter cited as the
1969 Act].
50. Ultimately the scaled increase will reach 15 percent with a $2,000 ceiling in 1973.
§ 802(b) of the 1969 Act, 83 Stat. 676, amending INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 141(b).
51. Reaching $1,300 for years after 1971. § 802(c) of the 1969 Act, 83 Stat. 676-77,
amending INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 141(c).
52. Reaching $750 in 1973, § 801 of the 1969 Act, 83 Stat. 675-76, amending INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954. § 151.
53. See Woodworth, Simplification and the 1969 Tax Reform Act, 34 LAW AND
CONTEMp. PRoB. 711, 715

(1969).

54. 1969 Act, § 511(b), 83 Stat. 635 amending INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 1201 (b),
(c).
55. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 56-58. For a complete legislative history of this law,
see Note, The Minimum Tax for Items of Tax Preference, 41 CiN. L. REv. 365' (19,72).
56. 1969 Act, § 804, 83 Stat. 685, adding INT. RsV. CODE OF 1954, § 1348. Since the
maximum on earned income encourages highly paid executives to favor more regular
earnings and less compensation in the form of profit sharing plans, the idea is to reduce the demand for preferential treatment of fringe benefits.
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of stating it simply as similar situation, similar treatment, Eisenstein makes a logical extension. The ideology of equity "maintains
that those who are similarly situated should be similarly treated,
and those who are differently situated should be differently treated.

Equity can be granted in two ways: by extending the provision
that creates unfairness to one similarly situated,5 8 or by removal
of the special provision which gives others grounds for equity. Invariably Congress adopts the former approach, making distinctions
which create multiple cries for more equity. 59 A mild example of
this is the provision for income-splitting, which arose in 1948 to end
the inequity between persons living in community property states
and others not so favorably situated, from a tax standpoint. This
then led through the process of equity to special rates for heads
of households in 1951, and further to surviving spouses in 1954.60
These provisions then in turn created an inequitably excessive differential as between joint and individual rates. The Tax Reform
Act of 1969 cured this problem by reducing individual rates.6 1 This
change had the unforseen effect of making marriage very costly
2
for two employed individuals.
There are of course practical difficulties in considering alternatives to income splitting, but the process does show how our tax
laws grow through extension of equity. And when the equity argument is combined with the ideology of barriers and deterrents we
see the extension of percentage depletion-starting with oil-to roughly a list of one hundred presently in the Code.6 3
In considering the twenty-eight provisions of the Tax Policy
Review Bill of 1972 that affect individuals, it is apparent that the
ability to pay advocate would favor the removal of most of the
listed preferences. He would certainly urge that the minimum tax
on preferences be made more effective, that benefits from capital
gains be reduced, and that exclusions and deductions most bene57. L. EISENSTEIN, supra note 25, at 13.
58. One of the recommendations made by the Treasury in 1963 was that the capital
gain treatment of certain ordinary income items be removed. This applied to patents,
sale of timber and coal royalties. Instead of restricting these items Congress added iron
ore royalties to the preferred list of items entitled to capital gains treatment. See Hearings Before the Comm. on Ways and Means on the Tax Recommendations of the President, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 24, 147 (1963); H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 63,
93 (1963) ; S. REp. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Seas., 88, 119 (1964).
59. Cary, Pressure Groups and the Revenue Code: A Requiem in Honor of the Departing Uniformity of the Tax Laws, 68 HARV. L. REV. 745 (1955), was alarmed with the
trend toward specialized provisions based on source of income which increase the inequality in the tax law.
60. P. STERN, THE GREAT TREASURY RAID 62 (1964) has an amusing chapter on this
point entitled "Your Wife May Be Worth a Million."
61. Equity by extension of preferences is humorously analysed in Blum & Johnson,
1913-2013, A Hundred Years of Income Taxation, 33 TAXES 41 (1955) and in Johnson,
The Last Taxpayer, 30 TAXES 181 (1952).
62. 1969 Act, § 803(a), 83 Stat. 678, amending INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1(a).
63. INT. Rzv. CODE OF 1954, § 613.
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ficial to higher-bracket taxpayers be eliminated, with the possible
exception of the charitable contribution deduction. The advocate
of the ideology of barriers and deterrents, on the other hand, would
urge the retention of many high-bracket preferences since they mitigate the harsh effect of too progressive a tax rate. Agreement
between the camps would arise to an extent in the area of personal
deductions based on hardship and in cases of special exemptions
and treatment for taxpayers with "reduced ability to pay." Since
economic incentives do not play an important role in the area
of personal preferences, the two ideologies do not merge as they
appear to be doing in the area of business credits and deductions.
As to the ideology of equity it will continue to be the most important
argument for and against tax reform. To the ability to pay advocate,
equity demands a code free of all but the most essential dispensations. To the ideology of barriers and deterrents, fairness can be best
accomplished by extending preferential treatment to all who can
make their case.
B. METHOD OF REFORM-COMPREHENSIVE
SUS AN AD Hoc APPROACH

TAX

BASE

(CTB)

VER-

Without doubt the ideologies of Eisenstein combined with strong
economic rhetoric will continue to be urged as arguments for and
against tax reform. However, the method in which to approach
reform is currently being debated. Chairman Mills' automatic phaseout approach would have meant first isolating the preference item
and then eliminating it within a period of time unless Congress
acted affirmatively to retain it. As suggested in the Introduction
to this article such an approach has a great deal of merit.
The advocate of a comprehensive tax base would go even further. He would seek
... to eliminate 'preferences' ruthlessly, no matter how persuasive or seductive their individual appeals may be, and
to impose the tax on the resulting CTB. The broader base
will permit rates to be reduced, and with lower rates the
benefit to be reaped by the restoration of any one 'preference' will be lessened; this will let some of the steam out of
efforts to renew the process of 'eroding' the base.Professor Bittker takes issue with this approach 65 and advocates
tax reform wherein each provision is considered by itself on its
particular merits. He argues that defining a preference or a tax
64.

Bittker, A Comprehensive Tax Base as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HAv. L.

REv. 925,

926-27

(1967).
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system devoid of preferences results in many distinctions that are
inequitable, but administratively necessary. One may bring into
the tax base certain items that are presently excluded such as
social security, railroad retirement, and veterans' benefits, but how
does one then exclude other federal, state, and local government
benefits? Taxing a student on a scholarship grant would broaden
the tax base, but how is this reconciled with the student who attends
a public institution free of charge? Other areas where benefits
occur would include subsidized housing, welfare services, government
guarantee of loans and so on. Hence, as to exclusions from gross
income it is impossible to draw the line between subsidies through
the reduction of the tax base and other indirect subsidies.
In analyzing exclusions and deductions Bittker recognizes what
the proponents of the CTB do not. Equity, treating as equals individuals similarly situated, is not possible within any workable system of income taxation. For one thing it is doubtful that one could
find two individuals in exactly the same situation, when account
is taken not just of income, but also of possessions and enjoyment
derived therefrom. To achieve theoretical equality one must enter
the arena of imputed income from taxpayer's assets, an area that
even the proponents from the CTB shy away from. Imputed income
would bring into the taxpayer's gross income the net rental value
of owner-occupied residences, of household furnishings, and of the
value of bank services furnished on checking accounts in lieu of
interest. Other distinctions that would generally have to be made
under the CTB would be between insurance recoveries and personal
injury recoveries, and distinctions between the treatment of taxexempt organizations and those that are not exempt.
An inconsistency Bittker sees in the advocates of the CTB, aside
from distinctions they make as to income exclusions and deductions,
is in their recognition that the income tax should be used as
a flexible fiscal tool. Thus incentives that encourage economic
growth such as the investment credit or the allowance of reduced
useful life for purposes of depreciation may be justified on economic
grounds but otherwise are clearly inequitable preferences to a segment or segments of industry.
I.

The Response ot CTB Advocates

Professor Bittker's article led to a series of retorts by the advocates for a comprehensive tax base. Professor Musgrave rejected
Bittker's ad hoc approach. 66 His analysis is to the effect that even if
the accretion concept of income does not solve all problems, of creat65.

Id.
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ing an equitable income tax, it does point the way to a proper solution of most problems, even though it may have to be qualified by
considerations of administrative feasibility, or, in some instances,
may have to give way to other policy objectives. Of course this is
one of Bittker's main arguments: exclusions because of administrative feasibility and deviation for policy reasons destroy the entire
concept of the CTB.
Professor Musgrave's concern is that the ad hoc provision by
provision approach deals with the problem of fairness without the
guidance of a general principle to which to relate specific provisions.
A general principle to which Congress can refer is argued to be
necessary because reform in past decades has been disappointing
and in most cases has added preferences to the Code rather than
taking them out. This, then, is the result of an ad hoc approach
to tax legislation.
The automatic phase-out concept of Chairman Mills would
of course, have led to ad hoc consideration, but the burden of
proof would have shifted to those who urge the preference, rather
than being on the reformer as it is now. Although Mills' proposal
did not speak in terms of CTB, his list of preference items is the
same as those listed by advocates of ability to pay in their justification of the CTB. This is not to suggest that Professor Bittker is not
an ability to pay advocate; rather, the method of reform is the issue
to which he addresses himself.
Dr. Pechman took issue with the ad hoc approach by arguing
that Professor Bittker misunderstood the implications of the HaigSimons definition of income.6 7 The concept according to Dr. Pechman
does not concern itself with the time interval over which income
is measured, nor the proper unit of taxation, nor personal deductions. Rather it is limited to the question of what receipts are to
be counted as income.
From the standpoint of the economist there is a correctness in
this but it overlooks the use or mis-use of the concept by tax scholars
of the ability to pay persuasion. Their arguments are phrased
more in terms of erosion of the tax base, which occurs through
exclusions, exemptions, deductions,and timing provisions.
The latest response to Bittker has come from Dean Galvin. His
66. Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARv. L. REV. 44 (1967).
67. Pechman, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Comment, 81 HARV. L. REV. 63
(1967). The concept of a comprehensive tax base is founded on an economic definition of
Income called by -these writers the Haig-Simons definition. Haig defined personal income as the money value of the net accretion to one's economic power between two
points of time," THE FEDERAL INcOME TAX 7 (R, Haig ed. 1921), and Simons regarded
his definition as interchangeable, being that "personal income may be defined as the
algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the
change in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of
the period of question." H. SIMONS, PERsONAL INcOME TAXATION 61-62, 206 (1938).
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article discusses the project initiated by the Section of Taxation of
the American Bar Association, which examines and supports the
CTB approach.6 8 In addition he points out that the Canadian Taxation Commission Report 9 had concluded that a CTB system was
workable and equitable.
2.

The Reply of Professor Bittker

Bittker responded to these challenges 70 by pointing out that the
use of tax preferences for economic policy in cases such as the investment credit had not been answered. Whereas, the CTB advocates
would argue against percentage depletion because it is a benefit that
Congress would not be willing to give in explicit form (direct appropriation), they are suggesting that the investment credit is proper.
Yet Bittker doubts that Congress would have been willing in 1964 to
appropriate 1.3 billion dollars as direct cash grants to 330,000 corporations making investments as specified by section 48 of the Code.71
He further takes issue with Musgrave who would allow deductions for
disaster expenses (including medical expenses), whereas these items
are not allowed in the economic definition and can be insured
against. Basically, Bittker returns to his argument that departures
from the CTB argued by its proponents are in themselves ad hoc
judgments with reasons no different from those given in support
of prpferences under existing law, 72 which makes it doubtful that
we will gain anything by adoption of the concept.
In response to Pechman's definitional argument, Bittker points
out that advocates of the CTB are using a broader definition of income than is Pechman. He further points up past inconsistencies
78
in this regard by Pechman himself.

Finally, Bittker argues that the approach of the Canadian Royal
Commission on Taxation would, as he had suggested before, require
many more sweeping changes in the existing tax structure than
have been acknowledged by proponents of the CTB. Among the
changes sought by the Canadian approach are:
integration of the corporate tax into the individual tax, aggregation of family income, taxation of capital gains at regular
68. Galvin, More on Boris Bfttker and !the Comprehensive Tox Base: the Practicalities
of Tax Reform and the ABA's CSTR, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1016 (1968).
69.

1 REPORT

OF

THE ROYAL COMm'N OF TAXATION

(Canada)

1-2

(1966).

Referred to

as the Carter Commission, Report.
70. Bittker, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Response, 81 HARM. L. REv. 1032
(1968).
71.
Only about 25% of the 1.4 million active corporations claimed the credit In 1964.
U.S. Treasury Dep't. Pub. No. 159, Statistics of Income-1964 (Corporation Income Tax
Returns, Preliminary), Table C.
72. Bittker, supra note 70, at 1036.
73. Id. at 1037.
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rates, and the inclusion in income of gifts, bequests, mortality
gains on life insurance, patronage refunds, mutual insurance
74
dividends, and recoveries in personal injury cases.
In conclusion to his response Bittker points out
that a system of countervailing 'preferences' might produce
a distribution of the tax burden conforming more closely to
the professed ideal of the CTB advocates than an undiscriminating elimination of those 'preferences' that happen to be
vulnerable at a particular time. Although I cannot prove
that this judgment is correct, it seems to me more plausible
than the contrary assumption that the elimination of any
preference, even if it is enjoyed only 7by
a generally dis5
favored group, will be an improvement.
Which is the better argument as to the method of reform? In
favor of the CTB approach it must be recognized that past "reforms"
using ad hoc analyses resulted in addition rather than subtraction
of preference items. And, to those of us who seek to understand
the ever-increasing volume of tax law there is strong appeal to
the idea of starting anew. Yet, how is a more CTB fairer? Without
worrying about the rather extreme arguments as to inequality caused
by the failure to impute income, is it fair to include benefits such
as social security and to exclude others based on administrative
feasibility? In examining the twenty-eight individual preference items
below, it will be seen that there is strong justification for most of
them. Their wholesale elimination, compensated for in theory by
a reduction in rates, may create serious inequities in the name of
the Haig-Simons definition of income. What seems to be overlooked
in the dialogue is that the taxing committees and Congress do operate under a general guiding principle: taxing all income from whatever source derived. Is it perhaps that the problem is not caused
so much by the approach to reform, but the fact that in being guided
by a general principle Congress reaches conclusions not satisfactory
to the CTB advocate?
There are two arguments that can be made in attacking an item
of tax preference: 1) that tax relief, a subsidy, cannot be socially
or economically justified by the recipient, and, 2) that although the
subsidy is justified, it should not take the form of tax relief. The
next section of this article will deal with the second argument.
C.

SUITABILITY OF THE TAX SYSTEM AS A VEHICLE FOR SUBSIDIES

In determining the nature of the objection of an ability to pay
74.
75.

Id. at 1040.
Id. at 1042-43 (footnote omitted).
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advocate to an item of preference it must be asked: is his concern
with the subsidy itself or is it with the use of the income tax
base as a vehicle for the subsidy? Could one assume that a preference
in entering the Code was initially justified as a subsidy within our
political framework? It must first be recognized that it is easier
for Congress to dole out funds by reducing federal income (tax relief)
than it is to directly appropriate the funds, a more time consuming
and involved process. On the other hand,the expertise of the tax
committees should not be overlooked; the members of the House
Committee on Ways and Means and of the Senate Finance Committee
are well versed in matters of tax policy, and appear to be guided
more by concepts of fairness and less by political pressures than
are other committees. The central question to be explored in this
section, however, is not the initial justification for a preference item,
but rather; assuming that it is a valid subsidy, is it proper to use
the Internal Revenue Code for its dispensations?
Dean Wolfman deals directly with this problem. 76 His analysis
concerning science lends itself to the broader question of when
tax relief, rather than direct appropriation, is proper. "Like a subsidy, tax relief shifts the financial burden from the recipient of the
' ' 77
benefit to the rest of the population.
A federal expenditure differs from tax relief in that the granting
of funds is subject to guidelines, and reporting requirements, for
a purpose that is more than speculative. Tax relief, on the other
hand, leaves the objectives and control with the individual recipient.
Federal direction and supervision is virtually nonexistent.7 8 Wolfman
would generally disfavor the tax route because it is "less open, not
carefully measured, not reflected in the federal budget and not
subject to periodic congressional review. ' 79 He also argues that
it is costly in that
[a]lthough this method avoids a bureaucracy of federal
experts to approve and supervise expenditures, it substitutes
tax administrators, tax planners and a tradition of protracted
administrative controversy and litigation. 0
It is not surprising that Wolfman would be most restrictive in
the area of tax preferences. He is an ideologist of the ability
to pay persuasion, and as such defines a tax system with integrity
to be one that is geared to the determination of economic net income
76.

(1965).
77.
78.
79.
80.

Wolfman, Federal Tax Policy and the Support of Science, 114 U.

Id. at 172.
Id.
Id. at 183.
Id. at 184.

PA. L.

REv. 171
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taxed without regard to its source. When the market does not operate
to allocate resources in a desirable way, then direct appropriation
and not tax relief should be preferred. He eschews market reallocation through tax preferences because they are "less directed, more
likely to be arbitrary, less susceptible to measure and change."',
Unlike the recipient of a direct grant, the beneficiary of the tax
system does not compete for or make his case in the open subsidy
82
arena.
What criteria determines the choice of vehicle? Wolfman suggests that Congress must recognize and accommodate the demands
of three interests which may be in tension:
1) society's stake in an income tax system with an essential
integrity,
2) society's stake in preserving substantial areas of activity
in which private initiative and management are given relatively free reign, and
3) society's stake in having federally allocated funds reach
their objectives as directly and inexpensively as possible.8 8
Although these criteria indicate that there are cases where tax
relief is more proper than direct federal expenditure, the preferences allowable by Wolfman are quite limited. He would yield to
tax relief as the alternative only "when private decision making,
free of government interference, is most compelling. 8 s4 Examples
that he gives are the charitable contribution deduction, and with
qualifications, the exclusion of scholarships and fellowships (if based
on need). He would deny, for example, tax favoritism to the inventor,
requiring him to fight his case in the subsidy arena.
Dean Wolfman presents serious and valid objections to the
general use of the tax system as a vehicle for subsidies. His
criteria do not address themselves to the issue of whether a subsidy
in some form is justified, but only if it should occur through
the erosion of the tax base. He has, however, as have the scholars
cited above, dealt with the issue of whether it is fair to tax a dollar
derived from a particular source differently than a dollar of economic gain of an investor (who has turned over his investment
within twelve months). If one argues that there should be no difference, as I would tend to do, then the subsidy must be justified
81. Id. at 182.
82. Id. at 184. "Funds allocated by the tax route may, and often do, go to projects
with little merit, at least by comparison with some projects whose claims to funds have
succeeded in competition for direct grants."
83. Id. at 182.
84. Id. at 184.
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on a ground that is more important than achieving equity. Finally,
if some social good requires a subsidy, is there justification for
using the tax base instead of requiring that a case be made for an
appropriation? In examining twenty-six of the preference items
affecting individuals, that have been isolated by Mills, these questions-fairness, policy justification, tax subsidy-will frequently
recur.
I.

INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES***

The present outlook for preferential provisions, which
is
for more of the same, might be unfortunate but not catastrophic.
Most of those who benefit materially from the special dispensations
will not be unhappy, while most of those who pay the price will
not even be aware that it is their treat. And as the preferences
multiply, it will become increasingly difficult for anyone, including
the experts, to tell who is paying for whom.
Walter Blum

A.

TIGHTENING UP THE

85

MINIMuM TAX (1,2)

Tax reformers made a significant gain when Congress officially
recognized the existence of preferential income and deductions within
the Internal Revenue Code.8 6 The addition of the minimum tax on
tax preference items was designed to increase the tax burden for
both individuals and corporations who otherwise could keep their
7
tax low through a variety of tax shelters allowed by the Code.
The minimum tax was added as part of the tax reform of
1969.88 Recognition of the need for special tax treatment of preference items originated in the statement made to the Joint Economic
Committee by the then Secretary of the Treasury, Joseph W. Barr. 9
It was pointed out that in 1967 there were 155 tax returns with
-adjusted gross incomes of over $200,000 a year and 21 returns with
adjusted gross incomes of over $1,000,000 on which no federal income
taxes were paid. The Treasury analyzed these returns in terms
of types of tax preferences to arrive at the major tax reducing
factors. 0 President Johnson's Treasury proposed a dual attack on
***Parenthetical references throughout this part will refer by number to the provisions
of the Tax Policy Review Bill of 1972 enumerated supra note 9.
85.
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., TAX REVISION
COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON BROADENING T-E TAX BASE 85 (Comm. Print 1959). [hereinafter cited as TAX REV. COMP.].
86. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 56-58.
87. See Hobbet, Minimum Tax on Preference Items: An Analysis of a Complex New
Concept, 32 J. TAx. 194 (1970).
88. 1969 Act, § 801 (a), 83 Stat. 580.
89. Hearings on the Economic Report of ,the President Before the Joint Economic
Committee, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 5-6 (1969).
90.
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these tax shelter items-a minimum tax on a recomputed tax base,
and an allocation of personal deductions to non-taxable income."1
President Nixon's Treasury then changed to an approach which.

would limit the use of preference items as well as using the allocation of deductions approach. 92 The House Bill generally followed
the Nixon proposals,93 whereas, the Senate Bill more generally followed President Johnson's approach. The version of the Joint Conference Committee of the House and Senate, signed into law in
December of 1969, was essentially a combination of the provisions
9
of both the Senate and the House Bill. 4
The Tax Policy Review Bill would have had the effect of tightening up the minimum tax by removing two items that substantially
reduce its effectiveness: a $30,000 exemption, and the allowance of
a deduction for ordinary income taxes. These items fit into the
computation as follows: first, items of tax preference99 are totaled;
the sum obtained is reduced by a $30,000 exemption, 9 and then
further reduced by any federal income tax payable. "Unused" federal
income taxes that are carried over from the past seven years9"
are allowed as a further reduction, and to any excess that remains
a ten per cent tax is imposed. This amount is of course in addition
to and apa.rt from ordinary income taxes payable by the individual.
CONG. IST SESS.. TAX REFORIMT STUDTES AND PROPALS. U.S. TREAS. DEPT. (Comm. Print
1969). [hereinafter referred to as TAX REFORM STUDIES) and Caplin. Minimnum Tax for

Tax Preferences and Rtelated Reforms Affecting High Income Individuals, 4 IND. LEGAL
F. 71, 71-78 (1970) for a detailed analyses of taxpayer abuses in this area.
91.
TAx REFORM STDrEs, snpra note 90, at 136.
92.
HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS. 91ST CONG., IST SEss., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF TREASURY TAX REFORM PROPOSALS, U.S. TREAS. DEPT. 79-100 (Comm. Print 1969).
This is undoubtedly where the term "tax preferences" entered the congressional picture.

93. H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1969).
94. Reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). For a detailed
analysis of the legislative history, see Caplin, supra note 90; Friend, The Minimum Tax
for Items of Tax Preference . . . Movement Toward a Comprehensive Tax Base? 41 U
Cr.
L. REV. 365 (1972). Mr. Friend mentions the pressures of special Interest groups on
this legislation. Real estate called the Limit on Tax Preferences (LTP) a "Let Them

Pay" provision. Farm lobbies called it antifarm. Charities appealed invoking equity. And
the attempted Inclusion of tax-exempt interest "was variously described as unconstitutional, disruptive, and economically short-sighted." Id. at 370 (footnotes omitted).
95. INT. Rrv. CODE OF 1954, § 57 defines tax preferences. There are two income items:
one-half of the net long-term capital gain over net short-term capital loss: and the
spread between

the

exercise

price

and fair

market

value

of

qualified

stock

options.

There are five deduction items (excess Investment interest disappeared after 1971):
amortization of pollution control facilities, the accelerated portion; accelerated depreciation on real property; accelerated depreciation on personal property subject to net lease;
depletion In excess of adjusted basis; and amortization of on-the-job training and child
care facilities. Two other tax preference items are applicable only to corporations: the
excess of the bad debt reserve deduction over that allowed by actual experience; and the
excess of the five-year railroad rolling stock amortization deduction over depreciation
"otherwise allowable." For in depth analysis of these provisions, "ee Caplin, supra note
90; Friend, supra note 94; Davenport & Goldman, The Minimum Tax for Tax Preferences and the Interest Limitation Under the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 16 WAYNE L. REv.
1223 (1970 ); Elliott, The New Mlnimunm Income Tax on Tax Preferences, 48 TAXES,731
(1970) ; Schenk, Minimum Tax for Tax Preferences, 48 TAXES 201 (1970); Shaw, Tax
Planning for High Bracket Individuals in Light of the New Act, TUL. 20TH ANN. TAX
INST. 370 (1971).
96. $15,000 for married individuals filing a separate return.
97. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 56(c).
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The minimum tax has had limited impact because of preferences
not included, and because of reductions of preferences allowed by
law. One analyst 9s discusses the following as limitations on the
impact of the minimum tax: omission of tax-exempt interest from
state and municipal bonds, unrealized appreciation in property donated to charity, the deduction for intangible drilling and development
expenses, and farm losses, from the list of preference items. Other
ameliorations, in addition to the $30,000 exemption and the deduction for ordinary taxes, are deferrals of the tax in the case of net
operating loss carryover,99 and where the preference items do not
produce a tax benefit. 100 Furthermore, the tax preference item of
capital gains, enjoyed by more individuals than any other preference, is an item given only limited treatment. 10 '
It is possible that the minimum tax will have the effect of
making the outright removal of preference items more difficult.
the provision is not too severe for the higher income groups at
which it is aimed, but it does prevent for the most part the
complete avoidance of taxes by one with a high income. 0 2 Thus,
a happy compromise is effected: the tax preferences stay in the
Code, justified by the ideologies and incentive arguments that put
them in initially, but their tax shelter effect is minimized. Since
these provisions originated in answer to public concern with the
rich paying no taxes, and since this possibility is significantly
limited by the minimum tax, Congress may be satisfied to stop
at this point. It is also possible that by using this vehicle Congress
may have found an easier way to deal with preferences than to
deal with them "substantively." If a subsidy through the tax base
becomes too unpopular, it may be added to the list of items subject
to minimum tax, or if already on the list, the effect of the minimum
tax may be increased.
Mortimer Caplin urges that in addition to broadening the list
of items subject to the tax the rate should be reconsidered. 03 Instead
of the present ten per cent, he suggests one-half the normal rates,
98. Johnson, Minimum and Maximum Taxes After Two Years-a Survey and General
Evaluation, 50 TAXES 68 (1972).
99. INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 56(b) provides that the minimum tax for the loss year
can be deferred to a subsequent year when the net operating loss is used.
100. Proposed Treas. Reg., § 1.57-4(c), 35 Fed. Reg. 19770 (1970).
101. See Johnson, supra note 98. Capital gains preference has the least actual impact
of all preference items because the tax preference floor (regular taxes plus $30,000) automatically increases with recognition of any capital gain. Hence, for 1972 the maximum
effective minimum tax rate is 1.5%. See Elliot, supra note 95, at 734-38.
102. According to the latest statistics on individual income tax returns, the amount of
tax preference items reported for 1970 totaled roughly 4.4 billion. This involved 74,641
tax returns. Only 18,646 returns paid taxes on preferences, however. Their preferences
were roughly 2.8 billion dollars and the revenue produced from the tax was 115.1 million
dollars. Internal Revenue Service, Preliminary Report, Statistics of Income-1970, Individual Tax Returns, table H, Wash., D.C., 1972.
103. Caplin, supra note 90, at 117-18.
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namely from seven to thirty-five per cent. He also agrees that the
preference floor should be removed ($30,000 plus the deduction
of ordinary taxes). And, although the allowance of tax carry-overs
to offset tax preferences was passed after Mr. Caplin's article went
to press, it is likely that he would urge the removal of this provision
also.
Even though the addition of the minimum tax on items of preference has added a great deal of complexity to the Code, which in
turn requires more tax planning (converting investments from preference to non-preference shelters) and tax planners, it does provide
a major vehicle for reaching the subsidies within the Code. The
vehicle will make substantive attacks on dispensations more difficult
to sustain and in fact may eliminate any chance for their removal,
but it will also be much more difficult for the recipient of an
income exclusion or deduction to argue for no tax at all. It appears
that if Congress can be persuaded to remove the floor, increase
he list of items subject to the tax, and increase the rate to
a realistic percentage, ability to pay ideologists will have achieved
much that they sought-at the price of a code with increased complexity.
B.
1.

CAPITAL

GAINS REVISION

Qualified Stock Options (9)

Although the qualified stock option is an item of preference,
it is much less so in light of the restrictive changes of 1964
and the minimum tax of 1969. Before examining the effects of these
laws, however, a look at the history of the stock option is in order,
since it represents a fine example of judicial and congressional
erosion of the income tax base.
Professor Lanning, in an excellent article emphasizing judicial
erosion of the tax base,1 0 4 points out that a great deal of the complexity in our tax system stems from the forced use of tax concepts.
He suggests that a concept such as "sale" or "reorganization" or
"gift" has at least definitionally some ascertainable factual content,
either now or when it was originally developed.
But if it is continually applied to situations not really described by that basic notion, or if it is not applied to situations where it is appropriate, then its use becomes more and
more artificial or 'conceptual' and it may come to rationalize special interests in a general context. 10 5
104.
105.

Lanning, Some Realtst
Id. at 33.

nt Tax Reform, TAX REv. ComP., supra note 85, at 19.
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Concepts such as "corporate contraction" or "capital asset" are
types that are inconsistent with the factual criteria which they
purport to embody. He notes that both serve almost exclusively
as rationalizations for special tax advantages. 1 6 The inconsistent
concept of capital gain, and the ambiguous concept of property
(which may be applied to almost anything) produce the stock option
argument. "It is easy to dispose of the stock option problems
if you say an option is 'property.' Then if you deal in 'property,'
ergo, you get capital gains treatment.' 1 7 But when so simple a
solution is abandoned and the problem is analyzed it is found that
A stock option represents a type of continuing relationship
between a corporation and its shareholders or employees.
The option holder is given the risk-free, interest-free use of
the corporate capital invested in the optioned property so that
he may-as dividend or compensation-take advantage of the
possible future appreciation of that property. The transaction
is not really closed until the option is exercised. At that point
the optionholder's receipt of the appreciated property represents a completed dividend or compensation. 08
Arguing, therefore, that a stock option is property and a closed
event ignores the substance of this transaction, replacing it with
mechanical form.
Capital gains treatment for stock option entered the law because
of this disregard for substance. The lower courts held that the
exercise of an option did not produce income, since it was intended
to convey a "proprietary" interest.10 9 This of course, ignores the
continuing relationship between the parties. The fact that the company intended to provide incentive through proprietary interests
does not change this relationship.
The Supreme Court applied the doctrine of substance over form,
and rejected the proprietary notion as a concept without meaning,
holding that, generally, the spread between the cost of the option
and its value at the time of exercise was taxable."10 Unfortunately
the decision came too late in that by this time Congress felt no
hesitancy in codifying the decisions of the lower courts."'
This legislation introduced the "restrictive stock option" termi106. Id. at 34.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Commissioner v. Straus, 208 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1953); Bradner v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. 566, aff'd per curiam (6th Cir. 1954); R.A. Bowen, 13 T.C.M. 668
(1954).
110. Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956); Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S.
177, rehearing denied 324 U.S. 695 (1945).
111. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 421, amending INT. ItEv. COD OF 1939, § 130A. See
Lyon, Employee Stock Options Under the Revenue Act of 1950, 51 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1951).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

nology into the Code, which was replaced by the term "qualified
stock option" in 1964. In connection with the 1963 Hearings the
Treasury emphasized the Supreme Court decisions as a ground
for redefining stock options as compensation. 1 1 2 But Congress did
not directly confront meaningful issues. In fact, one member of
the House Ways and Means Committee took lightly the alleged
abuses in this area. He states:
Regretfully the testimony of others that there aren't these
abuses does not receive similar dissemination to the public
...
the Treasury Department has a grave burden on its back
in this area as well as others to come forward to tell this
committee and the public what they are talking about when
they alleged there were abuses here or abuses in the pension
program, stock option plan, and so forth.....
113
Nonetheless, Congress did substantially restrict stock option abuses
by the Revenue Act of 1964.- 4 The qualified stock option approach
of 1964 required that the options be at least 100 per cent of the fair
market value of the stock at the time of grant, that it must
expire within five years from grant, and that the stock must be held
at least three years from acquisition to qualify for long-term capital
gain treatment." 5
In addition the minimum tax of 1969 hits qualified stock options
very hard. Under these rules the preference arises when the stock
option is exercised. The spread between the fair market value of
the stock and the exercise price defines the amount of the preference. This item thus arises at a time when the executive has no
tax savings, indeed, he may have borrowed money for the exercise
of his privilege. But, in addition to this, the sale of the stock after
the three year waiting period results in another preference, that
on long-term capital gains. Furthermore, the minimum tax paid
on exercise of the option does not add to the basis of the stock,
nor does it push up the preference floor as do capital gains." 16
112. See Hearings Before the Committee on Warys and Means on the Tax Reco,nmendations of the President, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 147 (1963).
113. Id. at 1444, remarks of Congressman Thomas Curtis, Mo.).
114. Adding §§ 421-425, 6039, 6652(a), 6678 to INT. REV. CODE OF 1954.
115. The comparison between the restricted stock options under the 1950 Act and the
qualified stock options under the 1964 Act, plus transitional rules, is analyzed by Persons,
What to Do About Key Employee Stock Options Under the 1964 Revenue Act, 42' frAXES
351 (1964). In addition to the requirement set out above the options must be issued pursuant to a plan approved by stockholders within 12 months before or after the plan is
adopted, and must be issued within ten years after plan, and must be non-exercisable so
long as there is an earlier qualified or restricted option outstanding at a higher price,
and optionee's holdings cannot exceed 10% of outstanding stock, and his employment must
be continuous from date of 'grant of option to within three months before exercise.
For additional in depth analysis, see Frei, Stock Options in the Light of the 1964
Revenue Act, 42 TAXEs 872 (1964).
116. See Johnson, supra note 98, at 74; Simon, Proposed Regulations on Tax Prefer-
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Consequently, qualified stock options are severely restricted by
the 1964 Act in not only the extended holding period, but more importantly in that the right of purchase must be equal to the fair
market value of the stock. In a period where stock prices are rising,
it is likely that these rights will never be exercised. When these
features are combined with the minimum tax on both exercise
and gain when sold, we see that this is much less a preference
than formerly.
Although stock options may be traceable to judicial conceptualism
it is likely that Congress would have instaled them on its own
initiative. The arguments for such treatment fall under Eisenstein's
ideology of barriers and deterrents, as subclassified in the dogma
that progression diminishes desire to work. The theory is that salaries
are a clumsy tool to motiviate executives,'1 1 and without stock
options men of higher caliber will seek employment elsewhere,
such as in the government or possibly the ministry."" The legislation
of 1964 and 1969 was a significant victory for the ability to pay
ideologists, but it is not likely that they will have further success
in this area. Again, the presence of the minimum tax as a vehicle
to deal with preference items limits the prospect of this item ever
returning to ordinary income treatment.
2.

Timber, Coal and Iron Ore Royalties (13)

In 1943 timber was no being properly conserved. Small timber
owners, in order to receive long-term capital gains treatment, sold
their timber holdings outright. These sales were to large lumbering
companies who would often move in and strip the land in a wasteful
operation which lacked the necessary reforestation steps." 9 Congress,
to conserve timber, provided that a taxpayer who either owns timber or has a contractual right to cut timber shall receive capital
gains treatment upon its sale in any form where he retains an economic interest. He may further elect to treat the cutting of timber as
a sale. 2 0 This preference for timber in 1944 resulted through the
arguments of "equity" in the granting of capital gains treatment
for coal royalties in 1951,121 for Christmas trees in 1954,122 and for
ences Give Clues on How to Avoid Them, 36 J. TAX. 92 (1972). See also Baker & Rosenbloom, Tandem Stock Options: Modification Problem Still Clouds the Usefulness of This
Tool, 36 J. Tax 44 (1972).
117. Comments of businessmen in NEWSWEEK, Dec. 21, 1959, at 68. See also S. REP. NO.
2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 59, 60 (1950); H.R. REP. No. 2087, 80th Cong ', 2,i Sess. 4-6
(1948).
118. Roswell Magill suggests that men may enter the ministry, The Impact of Tax Leakages-A Postscript to Randolph Paul, 12 TAX L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1956).
119. See 1963 House Hearings, supra note 112, at 3080, (Dr. Kenneth Beggs, Econ.
& Mgr. of Forest Industry Studies, Stanford Research Institute, Melo Park,, Calif.).
120. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 631 (a), (b).
121. This is best shown in the reprint of the 1951 Hearings on the coal arguments In
the 1963 House Hearings, supra note 112, at 3600 (included in statement of Rolla Canp-
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iron ore royalties in

1964.123

The reasoning was basically as follows: small owners of timber
lands will not be encouraged to sell outright to wasteful lumber
companies since they can receive the same benefit simply by cutting
or retaining an economic interest. Holding on to their land, they
will be encouraged to provide for the future by proper reforestation.
Therefore timber would be conserved. This may have been a reasonable argument, but it should have been recognized that similar
treatment would be demanded by other industries. And, there
is no real evidence that timber was conserved, but it is evident
that the tax law was not. Ordinary income from the timber business
became capital gain.
The Treasury's proposal in 1963124 would have had the effect of
restoring ordinary income treatment as to timber with the exception
of the first $5,000 of sales. Ninety-nine per cent of timber owners,
who own sixty-five per cent of the timber lands would have been
completely protected by this exclusion.125 By this time, however,

inertia had asserted itself and the preference was too deeply embedded within our tax system for either removal or restriction. 126
The approach throughout ignored alternatives. Alternatives that
without doubt, would have accomplished conservation. In 1943 Congress could have required under penalty that proper restoration
be conducted by timber companies. It could have subsidized directly
to encourage conservation. Direct subsidy would have been least
painful, if Congress - acting as a body, rather than as a tax committee - determined that practices were wasteful and that the resource should be protected.
Coal, on the other hand, is an example of subsidization (through
the tax base) of a depressed industry. Gain on payments for coal
127
mined on the lessor's land is entitled to capital gains treatment.

This provision was originally argued into the law in 1951, with a
clarifying amendment in 1954. The rationale was quite simple:
a coal lease is a capital asset-this is proven by comparing it with
28

timber.1

bell, Pres., Nat'l Council of Coal Lessors).
122. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 631(a), For purposes of this subsection and subsection
(b), the term timber "includes . . . 'evergreen trees which are more than 6 years old at
the time severd from the roots and are sold for ornamental purposes'." See P. STERN,
THE GREAT TREASURY RAmo 267, 274 (1964) in a chapter entitled "Old 'Loopholes' Never
Die..."
123. See 1963 House Hearings, supra note 112, at 151, 3626, amending INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, §§ 272, 631(c), 1016(a)(15), 1231(b) (2), and 1402(a)(3)(B).
124. 1963 House Hearings,supra note 112, at 151 and exhibit 13 at 388.
125. Id. at 151.
126. See Smith, Tax Treatment of Capital Gains, TAX REv. COMP., supra note 85, at
1233, 1237.
127. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 631 (c).
128. This is best shown in the reprint of the 1951 hearings on the coal arguments in
1963 House Hearings, supra note 112, at 3600.
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This simply states a justification. The need arose because of
what is termed "lock-up." Old coal leases which run from twentyfive to one hundred years provided a fixed dollar royalty, unlike
oil royalties which operate on a percentage basis. As such, coal
royalty payments are confiscated by inflation which discourages all
efforts of coal miners to lease coal for development.129 The 1951

capital gains treatment extended, however, to all leases and not
just those that are "locked-up." The reasons were to encourage
"the leasing of coal which otherwise would have been left undeveloped" and "make unnecessary the sale of coal lands by small individual holders to large corporations in order to realize capital
gains";1 30 in addition, relief was given to pre-existing long-term
leases.
Unfortunately, removal of capital gains for coal was not pushed
by the Treasury in the 1964 Revenue Act.'3 ' And, as a result of this
failure, iron ore, on the basis of similar situation, similar treatment,
could justify its special dispensation." 2
There are two aspects to the problem of subsidies for timber,
coal and iron ore: Do these industries deserve special treatment in
any form, and, if they do, should it be in the form of tax relief?
Is this an appropriate issue for a taxing committee? Could these
industries have made their arguments in the open subsidy arena?
From the standpoint of ideologies, an individual with ownership
In timber, coal or iron ore can argue on the one hand the barriers
and deterrents that ordinary income treatment would pose for ecol129. Id. at 3543, (R.L. Hirshberg, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Nat'l. Coal Assoc.).
130. Id. at 3543.
131. 1963 House Hearings, supra note 112, at 611-13. Removal of capital gains for
coal would have resulted in annual revenue gain of $2 million, which was apparently
considered quite insignificant:
Secretary Dillon: I would like to emphasize again, this [coal] is not a
major suggestion. It is probably the smallest suggestion in the whole bill.
Id. at 611.
Congressman Baker: And could well be put in Mr. Byrnes' 'deep-freeze' by
unanimous consent. Surely not 2 million-you mean removing the capital
gain on the royalty of coal would only net $2 million? Id. at 612.
Secretary Dillon: On this coal thing, as I said a number of times and will
repeat it now, is a very minor item. It Is not even mentiond in my statement. It is found in the technical annex just to complete the picture of
the various definitional problems. It is only mineral royalty that is treatied
this way. It is certainly so minor that if there is any feeling about this, I
would be the last one to object to forgetting about it. Id. at 613.
132. The Ways and Means Committee in adding iron ore royalties to those items entitled to capital gains treatment reasoned:
The capital gains treatment provided by this bill should encourage domestic
leasing of iron ore production relative to foreign production. . . . Your committee recognized, however, that iron ore royalties do not represent income
from the sale or exchange of capital assets and for that reason has classified income from the sale or exchange of iron ore royalties as class B
capital gains rather than class A gains even though held more than two
years. [This breakdown of capital assets dropped out of the Act].
I.R. Rep. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 93, 94 (1963). For an argument based on equity,
supporting the coal need and analogizing it to iron ore see 1963 House Hearings, supra
note 112, at 1385 (J.R. Greenlee, Chin., Nat'l Affairs Committee of Am. Iron Ore Assn.).
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ogy, generally, or to the investor specifically. At the same time
he can emphasize the depressed industry argument, which results
In reduced ability to pay. 13 3 It is easier for this beneficiary to
seek his subsidy in the form of tax savings. In making his case
before the open Congress he would either have to justify 1) government sharing of costs through direct subsidization or 2) monopoly
pricing.
This would appear to be an area where tax relief is most inappropriate. Without opposing the social or economic objective of such
legislation, it is an ideal case for the application of Wolfman's criteria. In view of the broad policy questions involved, and since direct
appropriation would not deter private initiative in these areas, why
use the tax base for the dispensation? Perhaps its because these
industries, or the individuals who benefit, could not make a direct
case. Chances, however, for reform in these preferences are minimal
-the lobbies are too strong.
3.

Lump-sum Distributionfrom Pension Funds (8)

Prior to the Revenue Act of 1969, certain lump-sum distributions
from qualified retirement plans were taxed in the hands of the recipients at capital gain rates. The reason for this approach was to
reduce the effect of the progressive rates on the receipt in one year
of bunched income, which had been earned over a period of years. 134
This was but one aspect of favorable treatment for deferred compensation: under qualified plans the employer receives a deduction for
contributions to the fund, which accumulates earnings without tax
consequences, and only upon distribution is the beneficiary subject
to tax. Nor are the contributions to the fund taxable income to the
employee at the time they are made.135 When all of these benefits
were combined with long-term capital gain treatment as to lump-sum
distributions, serious policy questions arose as to this tax deferral
technique. 13 6
133.
In
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), an ineffectual
conspiracy by a coal selling agency to maintain prices was allowed. By the time this
was decided the "United States had embarked on the vast National Industrial Recovery
Act experiment with 'cooperation' in place of competition as the rule of trade." L.
SCHWARTZ, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 225 (1959). As the ZNext step
in saving the coal industry, Congress passed the Guffey Coal Aot, 49 Stat. 991 (1935),
and the Bituminous Coal Act of April 26, 1937, 50 Stat. 72 (1973), held constitutional in
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co.- v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940). Under the Guffey Act
owners of coal mines were not only permitted but compelled to conspire together to sell
below certain minimum prices fixed by the government.
This demonstration of reduced ability
L. EISENSTEIN, srupra note 25, at 51-52, 144.
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is

given

further

commentary

by

134.
H.R. REP. No. 91-413, pt. 1, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 154 (1969). Requirements are
set out in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 402(a) (2), 403(a) (2).
135.
See Sherman, Deferred Compensation-Qualifted and Nonqualified: A Legislative
Perspective Through the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 11 WM. & MARY L. REv. 870 (1970).
136.
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The Tax Reform Act of 1969 amended several sections of the
Code to limit this preference item. 13 7 The effect of these changes
is to eliminate long-term capital gain treatment as to the portion
of the distribution attributable to post-1969 employer contributions.
Hence, that portion of the distribution attributable to the employer
after 1969 will be treated as ordinary income. 1a5 Capital gains treatment is still available as to the tax free accumulation of earnings
in the plan prior to distribution, and it is this item that Chairman
Mills isolated as a tax preference. As to items treated as ordinary
income under the 1969 changes, relief for bunching is provided by
the use of a constructive seven year averaging formula. 13 9
Other features of the 1969 Reform serve to make the lump-sum
distribution less attractive. Even though the maximum tax on earned
income was added, providing for a fifty per cent limitation,4 0 the
ordinary income element of a lump-sum distribution is not considered "earned" for this purpose.' 4 1 And, each dollar of "unearned"
income is pushed into higher brackets by each dollar of "earned"
income.J4 2 Also, the long-term capital gain element of the distribution (tax free earnings of the fund) is an item of tax preference
subject to the minimum tax. 43 Furthermore, as a result of the 1969
changes, the portion of net long-term capital gain in excess of
$50,000, no longer qualifies for the twenty-five per cent maximum
alternative tax rate.144 These items can now reach a maximum
rate of thirty-five per cent.
In view of all of these factors the need for total elimination
of capital gain treatment as to lump-sum distributions is lessened.
The minimum tax may be sufficient as a vehicle to control abuses
in this area.
4.

Sale or Exchange of Patents (36)
When all substantial rights to a patent are sold by its holder to

RETIREMENT
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(1965).
137. 1969 Act, § 515 (c) 83 Stat. 645, amending INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 402, 403.
138. See Slavitt & Brady, Planning for Distribution from Qualified Plans: a Comparative Analysis, 3 TAX ADVISER 281 (1972) ; Finch & Daleiden, Proposed Rgs. Introduce
Dual Concept for Computing Tax on Lump-sum Distributions, 34 J. TAX. 322 (1971);
Hanson, Problems in the Taxation of Lump-sum Distributions of Employer Securities,
34 J. TAX. 325 (1971).
139.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 72 (n) (4). The provisions of § 72 (n) previously applied only to self-imposed

individuals under a

five-year averaging

approach. To qualify

for th 7-year averaging the employee must have been a plan participant for a minimum
period of five years. See Schechter, Interaction of Maximum, Capital Gain, and 7-year
Averaging Taxes, 3 TAX ADVISER 138 (1972).
140. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1348.
141. See Slavitt & Brady, supra note 138. TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1348(b) expressly
excludes distributions to which § 72(n) applies.
142. TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1348(a) (3).
143. TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 57(a) (9).
144. TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1201(b),(c).
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a nonrelated person, it is treated as a sale or exchange of an asset
held for more than six months and as such qualifies for preferential
capital gain treatment. This feature was added to the Code in
1954. It specifically provides for capital gains treatment "regardless
of whether or not payments in consideration of such transfer are-1)

payable periodically . . .or

2) contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition of the
property transferred. 145
Consequently, payments that resemble royalties or even rentals
do not put the transfer into the ordinary income category.
The justification for so special a preference is one of economic
incentives, or as an ideology, the removal of barriers and deterrents.1 4 Special treatment under the Code is justified by the same
rationale that one uses to justify the monopoly accorded an inventor
generally within our patent law: 1 47 the need for scientific inquiry.
A reason other than incentive is that of public welfare. Public disclosure of inventions is in the public interest, and special treatment
of patents encourages this.1 48 However, a similar justification would

seem to exist in the case of the creative individual who develops
9

14
a copyright. Yet, he gets only ordinary income treatment.

As to copyrights, compositions (literary, musical, or artistic),
and similar property, they are expressly precluded from capital
gain treatment by the Code.1 50 However, prior to the addition of
this section in 1950, the tax status of creative works depended
upon whether the author was an amateur or a professional. As an
amateur his work became "property" entitled to preferential treatment, but as a professional his work was treated the same as a personal service effort and his compensation was simply wages for
his labors. 151 This area indicates the difficulty in the concept "prop-

erty." Since all property is a capital asset (unless excluded)
entitled therefore to long-term capital gains treatment if held
more than six months (not necessary for a patent), Congress
the courts are in a definitional arena. Yet, without difficulty

and
for
and
one

145. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1235.
146. See Yater, The Effect of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 on the Sale or Exclusive License of a Patent, 37 J.P.O.S. 155 (1955).
147. See Rhoades & Wallen, Section 1235: What it Does (and Does Not) Do as to Inventions-Paten'tedand Otherwise, U. 'F So. CAL. 20TH TAX. INST. 677 (1968).
148. Id. at 689.
149. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221(3) expressly excludes it. See Wolfman, supra note
76; Eulenberg, Books and Mousetraps, 54 A.B.A.J. 1187 (1968). For further exploration
of the definitional problems in this area on franchising under the 1969 Tax Reform Act
see Hall & Smith, FranchisingUnder the Tax Reform Act, 4 IND. LaAL F. 305 (1970).
150. INT. REV. CODE or 1954, 5 1221 (3).
151. See Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gain Taxation, TAX REv. Comp.
oupra note 85, at 1203.
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can make the argument that any sort of a right is property. The
right to future wages under an employment contract, for instance,
is the most obvious example of ordinary income. What has been done
by the courts, and less so by Congress, is to try to determine
the predominant ingredient in the transaction: is it personal effort
or more like an investment gain? This then serves as a rough guide
to preferential treatment. But doesn't the patent obviously fit into
the personal effort category? Yes it does. In the words of Stanley
Surrey,
these aberrations in the patent, stock option, and pension trust
situations really involve a congressional tax bounty through
the gift of a capital 152
gain status and should not obscure the
definitional problem.
But, more broadly reflected, this argument attacks the whole nature
of the capital gains treatment itself. What justification exists for
reducing the tax of an investor? The arguments as to bunched
income have certainly disappeared in light of the comfortable averaging provisions,15- 8 and even without this the argument for special
15
treatment after only six months is difficult to sustain. 4
Ignoring the preferential treatment of investors, capital gains
for patents should certainly be eliminated. This is an area where
"equity" would otherwise seem to require its extension to authors
by defining their works as property and to other receiving royalty
payments, by defining these receipts as a sale or exchange. In the
words of Dean Wolfman,
Tax favoritism for the successful inventor has not been justified. If he is to seek reward beyond that which the patent
monopoly and his achievements in the market place afford
him, he should be made to fight his case in the subsidy
arena. If the image of the successful inventor pleading in
public for a subsidy appears ludicrous, it may
suggest that
1 55
his case for tax relief needs similar exposure.
5. The Alternate Tax and the Deduction for Long-Term Capital
Gains (16,54)
As to individuals, prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the computation for tax on net long-term capital gains was arrived at by
applying the ordinary tax rate to one-half of the net long-term
152.
153.

Id. at 1217.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1301-1305.

154. For exhaustive coverage of all sides of the capital gains question see, TAX REV.
COMP., supra note 85, at 1193-1395.
155. Wolfian, supra note -76, at 185.
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gain, 15 6 or, where this rate exceeded fifty per cent, one could apply
an alternate tax of twenty-five per cent. 157 The 1969 changes did
not disturb these methods, but did increase the tax rate as to
gains over $50,000.1-5 Ignoring the minimum tax on preference items,
gains in excess of $50,000 can reach a maximum tax rate of thirtyfive per cent.
The repeal of the alternate tax (applicable only to non-corporate
taxpayers) would in effect tax the individual on long-term capital
gains at one-half his ordinary income rate. But the repeal of the
deduction for long-term capital gains would have the effect of
subjecting all gains to the ordinary income tax rates.
The proposal would have the effect of eliminating a major
problem area in tax law: what kind of income does an item represent? The arguments advanced in favor of special treatment are
numerous, 15 but it would appear that the major one is that it is
unfair to tax an appreciation that took place over many years
entirely in the year of realization at progressive rates. This argument loses much of its force as to gains realized within one year
8 0
of asset acquisition.1
Nor does the argument support the rates
applied to the gain. Inclusion of only half of net long-term gains
at all income levels can result in gains taxes below the current
bottom bracket-a reduction in rate not needed to relieve progression. 16' In fact, if this is the major justification for capital gain
treatment, and not that gains from capital are inherently different
from gains through labor, then the problem can be solved through
averaging.162
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1202.
156.
157. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 8 1201.
158.
For a detailed analysis, see Andrews & Freeland, Capitail Gains and Losses of Individuals and Related Matters Under the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 12 ARIZ. L. REV. 627

(1970). The authors gilve the following example, at 636, wherein taxpayer has $100,000
of ordinary income plus $100,000 of net section 1201 gain. The tax liability of $83,000 is
computed

as follows:

$100,000

Ordinary income

$53,090
12,500

Tax
25% of first $50,000

Tax on ord. inc. plus % of 1201 gain ($150,000

times

ord. rate)

$ 88,090

Less tax on ord. inc. + % of gain over $50,000
($100,000 + $25,000 times ord. rate)

-70,590

+17,500
$83,090

159.

These arguments are classified by Blum, A

Arguments, 35 TAXES 247 (1957).

Handy Summary of the Capital Gains

A more elaborate treatmnt is given in L. SELTZER, THE

NATURE AND TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LossEs (1951).

160.

The asset need only be held for more than 6 months. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

§

1222(4).
161.
The Revenue Act of 1964 added the five-year averaging provisions to the Code to
162.
The Revenue Act of 1964 added the five-year averaging provisions to the Code to
replace prior selective provisions. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1301-1305. A more sensitive

system, called cumulative averaging or cumulative assessment, is analyzed by Vickrey,
Tax Simplification Through Cumulative Averagiag, 34 LAw AND CONTEMp. PROS. 736
(1969).
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The conflicting opinions in this area vary with -ideology.
Ignoring administrative difficulties, an ability to pay advocate
might recommend taxing capital gain at ordinary income rates
even though it is unrealized. At the other extreme the barriers
and deterrents enthusiast may argue for "roll-over," that is, not
taxing the sale of a capital asset as long as the proceeds are reinvested. But between these extremes one must look at the problem
of whether or not the gain of an investor should be preferred over
the income of a wage earner. Should the fact that one holds "property" for a period in excess of six months give him a tax subsidy?
Surely holdings of property for many years and a turn-over at a
large profit merits special treatment, but isn't this problem easily
dealt with by a comprehensive averaging provision, using a declining rate scale if it be necessarv?
As rewarding as it is for a tax professor to dream about
a world without capital gains (the tax practitioner may not feel
rewarded with such change), one must realistically conclude that
the elimination of preferential treatment for capital gains is not
forseeable. Elimination of the alternate tax, however, presents a
real possibility. This seems to follow from the changes in 1969.
The establishment of the ceiling on the alternate tax at $50,000
provides an easy mechanism for reducing this by stages to zero.
And, since the current maximum is thirty-five per cent versus the
alternate tax of twenty-five per cent under $50,000, it would not
involve a radical change.
C.

EXCLUSIONS

Most of the personal subsidies by way of exclusion have been
with us in one form or another since federal income tax began.
Normally, these are not thought to be preference items in the
same league as percentage depletion, investment credit, or accelerated depreciation. Yet whether the dispensation comes by way
of business activity, it has the same effect of narrowing the
tax base. An exclusion reduces gross income and is therefore objectionable to the ability to pay advocate pursuing the comprehensive
tax base. His concern is with the fact that an exclusion is not
"source" oriented, and consequently does not meet the test of taxation of income regardless of source. Pressure on Congress to eliminate these exclusions, however, is slight, with the possible exception
of interest on municipal bonds. A reason for this, aside from
the rationale for the preference, is that excluded income is not
reported, and so meaningful statistics can not be developed as to
the amount of the tax base erosion. This latter problem could be
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corrected by requiring that recipients of this special relief report
the excluded amount, which would then allow the Treasury Department to develop arguments based on loss of revenue. Let us examine
those items of exclusion that have been singled out by Chairman
Mills as preferences.
1. The $5,000 Death Benefit Exclusion and Exclusion of Group-term
Life Insurance of Employees (3,4)
Since 1913 Congress has provided for the exclusion from gross
income of amounts received under a life insurance contract paid
by reason of the death of the insured. 183 The policy reasons underlying this exclusion are unclear. 6 4 However, this exclusion 165 provides
the justification for excluding death benefits, not in excess of $5,000,
to the beneficiary or the estate of an employee paid by reason of
the death of such employee. The purpose of this dispensation was to
eliminate the hardship resulting from the fact that the exclusion
at that time was limited to life insurance. 66 But what really makes
this item a preference is that the compensation in the form of premium is not taxable to the employee.
Perhaps as a consequence of this the comprehensive tax base
enthusiasts make war on this special $5,000 benefit, but do not seek
the inclusion of life insurance proceeds generally. This distinction
is without justification from Professor Bittker's viewpoint. While not
advocating the inclusion of life insurance proceeds in taxable income, he recognizes that it is a preference as that term is used
by CTB advocates, and one that encourages the purchase of insurance because of tax incentive, and one that invites the exclusion

of fundamental substitutes for

it.167

On the other hand, exclusion of premiums paid by an employer
on group-term life insurance for an employee is a fringe benefit
of greater consequence. Currently such insurance in force totals
approximately $500 billion, and insures in excess of 75 million persons. 18 Prior to 1964 all premiums were excluded from the employee's
income. The President's proposal at that time would (have taxed
employees on benefits from group-term insurance in excess of $5,000
in coverage. In addition an employee's income would have been
163.
164.

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101(a).
See Wentz, An Appraisal of Individual Income Tax Exlusions, TAX

REV. COmp.,

supra note 85, at 337.
165.

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101 (b).

166.

See S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).

167.
Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, S0 Hnv.
L. REV. 925, 943-44 (1967). See also Swihart, Federal Taxaition of Life Insurance Wealth,
37 IND. L.J. 167 (1962).
168.
See Clarke & Lee, Employee Life Insurance Benefits: The Inequity of- Section 79,
50 TAXES 120, 120-21 (1972).
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taxable on the earnings on the cash surrender value of split-dollar
insurance which was applied to reduce his premium. 6 9
The taxing committees compromised on this provision. The House
Ways and Means Committee raised the proposed $5,000 "exemption"
to $30,000,170 and the Senate Finance Committee further increased
this to $70,000.171 The law as passed covered only group-term insurance and taxed employees on the benefits for coverage, if in excess

of $50,000.172
Although this constitutes a substantial preference item, particularly in view of the fact that most plans do not provide employees
with more than $50,000 in coverage, there are difficulties with
taxing this form of compensation. The exclusion has been part
of the law since 1920 and although the rationale given for the
ruling does not have equal force today-that the benefits flow to
dependents and not the employee, and that the policy is dependent
on continued employment or death and builds no other benefitsthe forfeitability feature of the argument is still a problem. 74 Furthermore, the removal of the all-out exclusion in 1964 and the provision for a maximum exclusion on coverages of $5,000 was met
with serious and concerted opposition from business, employers,
75
and insurersY.
And, both the Senate and the House recognize the
desirability of encouraging employers to provide life insurance protection for employees. 7 6
It would not be realistic to assume the elimination of these dispensations, although a reduction in the amount excludable would
be a possibility. A difficulty in this area is that life insurance contracts represent a form of savings, and therefore it would appear
that the return in excess of investment for death benefits not in
excess of $5,000 is too much like life insurance, to argue for its inclusion. A difficulty with this argument, of course, is the $5,000
limitation. If the justification is to equate employee death benefits
with life insurance treatment under the Code, then there i's no reason
for the limitation.
This seems to be one more case where the unexplained ex169. Hearings Before the Committee on Wa,s and Means on the Tax Recommendations
of the President, 88th Cong., 1st SesS., pt. 1, at 20 (1963).
170. H.R. R'EP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1963).
171. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1964).
172. H.R. REP. No. 1149, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1964), adding §§ 79 (a), (b), (c),
6052; amending, INT. REV. CoDE oF 1954, §§ 3401(a) (14), 6678, 7701(a) (20).
173. Law Opinion 1014, 2 CUM. BULL. 88 (1920).
174. For more elaborate history and discussion, see Walker, Group Life Insurance,
N.Y.U. 23D ANN. INsT. ON FEn. TAX 153 (1965). The extension of this benefit to permanent group-term is made by Clark and Lee, supra note 168.
175.
See Hearings, supra note 169, at 108.
176. See S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1964) ; H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th
Cong., lst Sess. 40 (1963).
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clusion for formal insurance has spawned another exemption
because of a subsequently determined discrimination
in the
177
tax treatment of similar types of payments.
As to exclusion from gross income of the value of group-term
life insurance of employees, removal of this preference requires
reconcilement of conflicting policy consideratons. First, the taxing
committees do recognize that such amounts are compensation to
the employee. 178 The Committee on Ways and Means pointed out
that the exclusion was inconsistent with tax treatment of other
types of life insurance protection furnished by employers to employees.
While this complete exclusion might have been considered
relatively insignificant when tax rates were low, the present
relatively high rates as well as the growing volume of groupterm life insurance now provided makes it particularly
in7 9
equitable to continue this complete exclusion.
On the other hand, exclusion of premiums paid up to a certain
amount are desirable because provision "of such a basic amount
of insurance does much to keep together family units where the
principal breadwinner dies prematurely. ' 180 The conflict that arises
between these two considerations is first the recognition of loss
of revenue from the exclusion of what is clearly compensation,
and second, the felt need to encourage employers to provide life
insurance protection for employees in amounts that will increase
in years to come from the standpoint of what is sufficient to keep
the family together after the breadwinner is gone. It is most doubtful
that this preference will ever be eliminated. In fact if the line can
be held at $50,000 it should be considered a victory for the ability
to pay advocates.
2.

Sick Pay (19)

It was proposed in 1964 that the exclusion from income of benefits received under wage continuation plans be repealed. This proposal was rejected by the House Ways and Means Committee. 8"
However, the committee did limit the exclusion by denying any
deduction for benefits received during the first thirty days of illness.
An amendment by the Senate then restored the present rules for
177. Wentz, supra note 164, at .38-39.
178. H.R. REP. NO. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 40, (1963);
2d Sess. 46 (1964).
179. H.R. REP. No. 749, supra note 178, at 39-40.
180. Id. at 40.
181. Id. at 44.

S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong.,
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cases where payments are below seventy-five per cent of regular
18 2
weekly wages.
Advocates of a comprehensive tax base would seek to include
in gross income not only sick pay, but also workmen's compensation
and military disability benefits. However, a truly comprehensive
base must go further. Existing law also excludes amounts received
as damages for personal injuries and for payments under accident
and health policies. 8 One concludes that there is a distinction
between loss of capital and loss of earnings. Compensation for medical expenses, suffering and loss of limb, are in the nature of capital
recovery, whereas, continued payment of an employee's wages under
a wage continuation plan is a replacement of earnings. At the same
time reduced earning power caused by aging and daily labor does
not allow one a depletion allowance. No recognition is made of the
fact that earning power is in itself a form of capital, and one
that is exhausted by illness.
Unfortunately, neither Congress nor the courts had such subtle
distinctions in mind:
During one period of 15 years, an employee could have
received the following treatment with regard to payments
made under a plan which was unchanged during the whole
time and without any pertinent change in the applicable law.
From 1943 to 1950, he would have been taxed. From 1950 to
1952, payments could have been excludable without argument. From 1952 to 1957, the Internal Revenue Service would
have claimed a tax which probably could have been recov184
ered in court. In 1957 ... the exemption was established.
Aside from the obvious inequity created by a tax preference as
uncertain as this one, the additional problem of giving equal
treatment to two employees--one who finances his own plan for
illness, the other employer-financed-creates greater difficulty. One
writer suggests that equity could be achieved by allowing a deduction for all persons who pay for a wage-continuation plan, whether
employer or employee, and then the benefits from such a plan. 85
The employee under this approach could exclude the employer
premiums from his income as he presently does, but in addition
an individual who provides for himself out of tax-paid dollars
for premiums could take a deduction. They would then both be
182. S. REP. No. 830, supra note 178, at 49.
183. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 104, 105. See Bittker, supra note 167, at 939.
184. Wentz, supra note 164, at 331. The exclusion came into effect in 1954, so 1957 is
the last year after the running of the statute of limitations for a claim for refund.
185. White, Consistent Treatment of Items Excluded and Omitted From the Individual
Tax Base, TAx REV. Comp., supra note 85, at 320.
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taxed on sick-pay benefits, to the extent they are a substitute for
wages.
A factor in favor of this argument is the recognition that amounts
paid to a person in lieu of wages or salary can hardly be excluded
within our concept of gross income. There is no doubt that they
represent earnings even if they are paid under a "wage-continuation plan." The combination of this factor with the element of
unfairness that results from giving tax advantage to one with a
minor injury (hospitalized and must stay at home) over another
who is more seriously impaired but who can stay on the job, makes
the random discrimination of section 105 (d) obvious.
The only possible justification for excluding payments in lieu
of wages, because of sickness, is on the grounds that the illness
has permanently reduced earning power: a capital impairment that
the taxpayer should be allowed at least to amortize over the remaining life of his earning powers. This may strike the reader as
being administratively impracticable and the author must agree.
It would appear to be an area where the wage earner is in a position
to bear the risk of illness, and loss of earnings, through loss-of-profits
insurance, if not provided by his employer. The plan suggested
above (allowing a deduction for such premiums and an inclusion
of benefits) seems most sensible.
As to the prospects for further confinement of this preference,
one must look at the policy justifications expressed by the taxing
committees. In connection with the Revenue Act of 1964 both the

House 186 and the Senate18 7 recognized that the exclusion at that time

of $100 per week (in the event of seven days of absence or one day
hospitalization as to the first week) was not justified in that amounts
received by employees were substitutes for wages or salaries which
would otherwise be fully taxable. Such payments are unrelated to
the costs of injury or sickness, and the hardship is already allowed
for by the exclusion of deduction of medical expenses.1 88 Furthermore,
the exclusion in its present form (1963) "tends to encourage malingering because it treats the employee who stays at home better
than another employee.
Yet, after the 1964 Act, a substantial dispensation remainedin
the Code. The Committee's reasons for this was to provide for permanently disabled employees or for those who have had a long,
continuing illness. In this case there is a true impairment of earn186. H.R. REP. No. 749, supra note 178, at 44.
187. S. REP. No. 830, supra note 178, at 49.
188. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 105(b) excluding amounts paid by employer for medical expenses of employee, and 213 allowing deduction in excess of fixed percentage.
189. HLR. lnP. No. 749, supra note 178, at 44.
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ings, plus large medical bills, will family financial requirements
continuing at the usual level.
As such we see that the present sick-pay exclusion is an attempt
by Congress to deal with the problem of impaired earnings. Perhaps
the dollar restrictions and he waiting period required by section 105
do not realistically measure chronic illness, or permanently impaired
earnings, but one must admit that the changes in 1964 were
a step in the right direction, and possibly more sensitive to the
notion of "capital impairment" than the suggestion that all premiums
be deductible. The best that can be hoped for in this area is further
tightening of requirements toward the more severe hardship cases.
3. Interest on State and Local Bonds (41)
Abolition of the exclusion of interest on state and local bonds
has been of constant concern. Elimination of this preference was
sought in 1922, 1938, 1940, 1942, 1951, 1954 and 1959.190 In addition
the tax reform effort of 1969 considered three aspects of this issue:
limitation on deductions; minimum tax; and an optional subsidy. 191
No action was taken on these proposals.
This immunity traces back to the Tariff Act of 1913,192 wherein
concern was expressed with the injection of a constitutional question
into the bill for the sake of only a few thousand dollars in taxes. 193
The issue of the constitutionality of the removal of the exclusion
would no longer appear to be debatable, 194 and one author concludes
that the Supreme Court could treat the immunity as required by
the sixteenth amendment only on the ground of concern over the
severity of the economic burdens on state and local government. 19 5
In addition to causing severe loss of revenues, 19 6 this represents
a preference for the high bracket taxpayer. The classical example
is that of Mrs. Horace Dodge who put an inherited fifty-six million
dollars all into state and municipal bonds producing income of
$1,680,000 per year. She did not even have to file an income tax
return. 97 If we were to deal with this subsidy to the states today,
19o. see Maxwell, Exclusion from Income of Interest on State and Local Government
Obligations,TAX REV. ComP., supra note 85, at 701-703.
191. For a very comprehensive discussion of this area and the 1969 treatment, see
Note, The Taxability of State and Local Bond Interest by !the Federal Government,
U. CINC. L. REv. 703 (1969).
192.
Act of Oct. 3, 1913, 38 166. 38 Stat. 168.

193. Department of Justice, TAXATION OF GOVERNMENT
192 (1939).
194.

BONDHOLDERS

38

AND EMPLOYEES

See Surrey, The Federal Income Tax Base for Individuals, TAX REv. COMP., supra

note 85, at 3.
195. Note, supra note 191, at 708.
196.
Since we are talking about an exclusion that is not reported even informationally
one can only guess at the loss of revenue. Dr. Pechman estimated that for the year 1956
$500 million was excluded. Pechman, Erosion of he Individual Income Tax,
TAX J. 1, 17 (1957).
197.
See P. STERN, THE GREAT TREASURY RAID 190-91 (1964).

10 NAT'L.
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explicitly, it is doubtful that the appropriation would be designed
to benefit the higher-bracket taxpayers. 19
Whatever the merits are for removing this preference item,
one must realistically conclude that it will be the most difficult
to eliminate. Aside from the constitutional argument, however
weak, the present federal course of revenue sharing appears to affirm the notion of reciprocal immunity, which is at the heart
of the historical argument. 9 9 This is in addition to the fact that
the provison may be too deeply embedded for removal without
serious financial problems for the state and local governments
200
dependent upon this subsidy.
Although the public has been alarmed by the showings that
the rich benefit from investing in municipal bonds, the benefit
to the municipality should not be overlooked. Replacement of this
subsidy by explicit appropriation or revenue sharing would substitute
additional federal administrators and the other costs of bureaucracy
for what is presently an "automatic" subsidy based on state needs
and voter demands for state and local functions. One may be
bothered by the fact that Mrs. Dodge earned $1,680,000 a year and
did not have to file a tax return, but at the same time it must be
realized that the investment of fifty-six million dollars in taxable
activities would yield an even greater after-tax return. The rate
on state and local bonds, as a result of the exclusion, is determined
by the market to be as low as possible. If all investors were
in the same tax bracket, the rate would be set at a level high
enough to attract investment, but low enough to yield minimum
tax savings relative to taxable investments. The rate of return is
higher than this percentage which would adjust to tax savings
because there are not that many wealthy investors, and therefore
the interest yield must be set to attract the middle-income
group. As such, the tax savings of the wealthy on municipals is
only the amount of the differential between the yield they receive
based on the need for middle income investors, and the yield they
would have received with adjustment for the tax savings. In this
light it is difficult to justify the removal of the subsidy.
4.

The $100 Dividend Exclusion (5)
In 1954 Congress adopted an exclusion of fifty dollars of dividend
income for individuals ($100 maximum for joint earnings of husband
198.
See
199.
See
supra note
200.
See

Surrey, supra note 194, at 3.
McGee, Exemption of Interest on State and Municipal Bonds, TAX REV. CoMP.
85, at 769.
Severson, An Evaluation of the Effect of the Removal of Tax Exemption of

State and Local Bonds, TAX REV. COMP., supra note 85, at 779.
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and wife), and also a credit of four per cent against tax for any
dividend income remaining after the exclusion. These relief measures
were provided to reduce the effects of double taxation, since profits
already taxed to a corporation were taxed again to individual share20
holders, and also to encourage equity investments in corporations. '
In 1964 the dividend credit was repealed, but instead of eliminating
the exclusion, as recommended by the Treasury, it was increased
to $100 ($200 maximum for joint earnings of husband and wife) .202
Justification for repeal of the credit was that corporate rates were
reduced by four per cent under the 1964 Act, which would alleviate
the problem of double tax, and that the history since 1954 had not
20 8
shown an increase in the ratio of equity to debt financing.
The increase in the amount of the exclusion, however, was
designed to deal with the issue of double taxation while at the same
time encouraging a broader stock ownership among those with
20 4
relatively low incomes.
Based on individual statistics for 1970, the amount of dividends
excluded in that year were $922,714,000, involving over 8 million
returns. As a result of the exclusion, over 3 million of these returns
escaped any taxation of dividends.2 0 5 These statistics indicate that
the beneficiaries of this preference include all levels of adjusted
gross income. Taxpayers in the $15,000 to $25,000 range are the
most numerous (as to returns with dividend income) and therefore
account for over one-fourth of all dividends excluded.
To what extent does the present exclusion deal with the problem
of double taxation of dividend income? As to the first $100 it
eliminates all difficulty. Beyond this amount the investor is fully
taxed on an item already taxed at the corporate level.206
To what extent is one affected as to equity investment by
the exclusion? Obviously, taxpayers who receive dividends in excess
of $100 are no longer influenced by this tax consideration. Wh~ther
it serves as an inducement for the modest saver to enter the market
cannot be determined but it is a possible factor.
To the extent that the exclusion does not serve these objections
it should be repealed. The statistics of income indicate who would
be most affected by the repeal, and the issue for Congress may
See H .R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1963).
Id. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d bess. 36 (1964). The Act amended INI. REv.
OF 1954, S§ 34,(a),(b)(2), 35(b)(1), 37(a), 46(a)(3), 116(a), (c)(3), 584(c)(2
642(a) (3) (), 702(a) (5), 854(a),(b)(1),(2), 857(c), 1375(b), 6014(a).
202. H.R. REp. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1963.
204. Id. at 33.
205. Internal Revenue Service, Preliminary Report, Statistics of Income-1970, Individual Tax Returns, table 5, Wash., D.C., 1972.
206. For an in depth analysis on the issue of double taxation, see TAx. REV. COMP.,
rupra note 85, at 1537-1610.
201.
202.

CODE
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be merely whether or not lower and middle income groups should
be encouraged toward equity investments. If such is the case then
the installation of a credit device rather than the exclusion seems
to be the better approach. Although the Treasury argued in 1963
that the 4 per cent credit against taxes had the effect of reducing
any double taxation by a much higher percentage for the higher
income bracket stockholders than for the lower bracket, 2 7 this concern was with the unlimited application of a fixed percentage to all
dividends in excess of the excluded amount. Under the present exclusion approach, however, a seventy per cent bracket taxpayer
saves $70 on his $100, whereas in the twenty per cent bracket the
savings is only $20. In view of the large investments of a top bracket
taxpayer $70 is not a significant amount, but as to the first $100
the higher the bracket the greater the benefit. On the other hand
if an investor were allowed a credit against his tax of 20% up to
the first $200 of dividends, the policy of encouraging investment
by middle and lower income groups would be furthered and the
20
effective rates would be more progressive.
5.

Scholarships and Fellowships (43)

Prior to 1954 a scholarship or fellowship was includable in gross
income unless it could be established to be a gift. Congress in enacting section 117 was perhaps trying to eliminate the case-by-case approach to this problem, but did not succeed since the issue is essentially the same: is the payment in compensation for services or is it
a gift? 20 9 The gift feature, and the long-standing recognition that
gifts are not income, make this exclusion a special one. Repeal of
section 117 could do no more than to place the problem under section
102, which excludes gifts and inheritances from gross income.
Aside from these obstacles there is substantial justification for
the exclusion. The "compelling reasons" given by one attorney are
as follows: revenue is not materially reduced because the recipient
is young without other income (he pays on his wife's earnings
during this period); he acquires increased earning power for future
taxes (unless he becomes a professor); the law provides safeguards
for compensatory arrangements, in that only purely educational
payments are excluded; higher education, important to the nation,
is encouraged; and colleges are benefited in that donors realize
that a contribution for scholarships is not diminished by taxes on
207. 10.4 percent in the highest income bracket, and only 4.3 percent for those subject
to the first bracket rate. H.R. REP. No. 749, supra note 201, at 33.
208. See Smith, Tax Treatment of Dividends, TAx REv. CoMP., supra note 85, at
1547-48.

209. See Wentz, An Appraisal of Individual Income Tax Exciusions, TAX REv. COmp.,
supra note 85, at 333-34.
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the recipient.2 10 In the words of another author "There is no need
'211
to tax those who may add substantially to our ability to survive.
Objections to the exclusion are based on the fact that the benefit
is without regard to the financial need of the recipient, and as in
the case of other exclusions it encourages litigation. In the words
of Dean Wolfman:
If all such grants were based solely on the recipient's financial need, and if he had no other income of any significance, exemption of the award would be a sensible, efficient
way to provide a measure of federal aid to education ....
[But] [t]he unevenness of the benefit which fellowship
exclusion provides, the litigation which it fosters, and the
waste and inequity involved when the recipient does not need
21 2
the support, all suggest that the exclusion be restricted.
He would confine this preference to candidates working toward their
degree where the award is made on the basis of need; other
awards being provided by subsidy or loan through direct federal
aid. This approach would necessitate limiting the concept of excludable gifts within the present framework, which could be accomplished through the modification of section 119.
Although there is merit in limiting a preference to those most
needy, it is difficult to define need in this context. The beneficiaries
of this preference would normally fall within the age range of 17
to 25, none of whom could normally afford to attend school without
working unless they received support from their family. Need then
is defined as parental resource, whereas, within this age range
there is a strong need to be financially independent. Furthermore,
the beneficiary of this subsidy is really the institution granting the
fellowship. As a result of the tax savings, the individual can "afford"
this activity versus working for compensation at a higher rate.
Repeal of the exclusion would force the institution and its donors
to increase scholarship and fellowship support without regard, in
many cases, to the need of the recipient.
When the policy justifications for this exclusion, not unlike those
advanced for the deduction of contributions for education, are totaled,
and combined with the embedded notion that the donee of a gift
should not be taxed, it would appear that this preference item
should be continued.
210. Ponder, fndividua Income Tax Exclusions, TAX REv. CoMP., suprv note 85, at
341-44,
211. Strayer, Individual Income Tax Exclusions, TAx REv. Comp., supra note 85, at
351.
212. Wolfman, Federal Tax Policy and the Support of Science, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 171,
186 (1965).
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6. Rental Value of Parsonages (42)
In the case of a minister of the gospel, gross income does not
include the rental value of a home furnished him, or the rental
allowance paid him for use in renting or providing a home. 213 This
exclusion traces back to the Code of 1921.214
The granting of a preference in this area is consistent with
the general practice at all levels to exempt from tax, or to give
some tax relief to, religious, charitable, and educational institutions.215 To the extent that such practices and institutions contribute

to our well-being, subsidization is desirable. Whether the subsidy
should take the form of a preference under the income tax, however,
is a separate question. On this issue the tests of Dean Wolfman
can be directly applied. Church support should be free of the governmental interference that must be present in a system of direct
appropriations.
If federally allocated funds are to aid religion at all the
exemption of church income and the charitable deduction
are much less likely to interfere with free religious exercise
or tend toward
an 'establishment' than is the federal ap216
propriation.
Of course the question here is not the allowance of the charitable
contribution to churches, but rather the provision of an indirect
subsidy to supplement the salary of ministers of the gospel.
On this narrow question of the rental value of a parsonage,
we must recognize that there are other professions inadequately
compensated. Is it fair to treat a minister more favorably under the
tax law than an elementary school teacher, for example? Ignoring
the constitutional problem, would society be willing to make direct
appropriations to ministers for purposes of housing? To the extent
it would not, the preference may be challenged.
As in the case of the scholarship exclusion, which benefited
the educational institution as well as the recipient, the exclusion
of parsonage rental value allows a church to pay a lower salary,
and therein the church and its congregation are benefited. Furthermore, contributions that would otherwise go toward higher salaries
to ministers can be used for other worthy objectives.
Whether justified or not this exclusion appears here to stay.
213.

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

§ 107.

214. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 213(b) (11). The enactment resulted from a Treasury
Ruling, O.D. 862, CUM. BUL. 85 (921), which treated the item as income.
215. See Zipperstein, Taxation of Clergymen, 41 TAXES 219, 234 (1963), wherein the
author considers tax treatment of other dispensations to the clergy as well.
216. Wolfman, supra note 212, at 184.

TAX POLICY REVIEW BILL

The amount of tax base erosion is slight, it has a long history,
and the policy justification is strong. It is not likely that the
taxing committees will raise the issue on their own accord, which
again would suggest that the approach of Chairman Mills, to examine all preferences, has great merit.
7. Gain on the Sale of a Residence by a Person over 65; Additional
Personal Exemption for the Aged and Blind; and the Retirement
Income Credit (44, 38, 45)
In 1963 President Kennedy urged the repeal of section 151 (b)
which gives an added exemption for persons sixty-five or over,
in addition to seeking the repeal of the complex retirement income
credit under section 37.217 The proposal would have substituted for
these provisions a credit against tax of $300. This credit would not
have exceeded tax liability, and would have reduced taxes payable
by an amount equal to one-half of the taxpayer's marginal rate
times non-taxable retirement benefits received. The proposal was
opposed. A representative of retired policeman argued against elimination of the credit 218 and civil service employees urged that their
annuities be added to the list of exclusions from income, 219 with

the system otherwise remaining unchanged. It is unfortunate that
this approach failed. It would have simplified income tax reporting
for the elderly, and, by the substitution of a credit, would have
been more in accord with the need of the taxpayer, in that dollar
savings would not have been dependent on a bracket.
The retirement income credit can be traced to a Treasury
Ruling which excluded social security payments from gross income
in 1942.220 This created an "inequity" against other retirement benefits, which led to the credit device in 1954.221 In not reducing
this dollar benefit (the amount of the credit) by dividends and
interest, Congress sought to encourage persons to provide for their
own retirement through investment.
On the other hand, the additional exemptions for persons over
sixty-five-2 and for the blind 228 derive from a new concept of ability
to pay; people in this group have a reduced prospective ability to
pay. 2 4 This concept, of course, does not square with the notion of a
217.

Hearings, supra note 169, at 16.

218. Ird. at 977.
219.\Id. at 986.
220.-I.T. 3447, 1 CUM. BULL. 191 (1942).
221. See H.1R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1954);
Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 8 (1954).
222. INT. REV. COE OF 1954, § 151(c).
223. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 151(d).
224. See EISENSTRIN, supra note 25, at 43.
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comprehensive tax base. As stressed by Professor Surrey in his
comments on the Revenue Act of 1948:
[a]nd again, it should be apparent that the income tax is
not the vehicle for relief to special groups handicapped by
physical ailments .... To prevent such distortions of the exemption provisions of the income tax, both the old-age and blindness exemptions should be eliminated. But such exemptions,
once granted, are difficult
to remove and, more likely, breed
22 5
additional aberrations.
This argument makes no allowance for reduced ability to pay.
It suggests that the subsidy required by the aged and the blind
be given explicitly rather than through the income tax base. This
approach complies with the requirements set forth by Wolfmansuch a subsidy through the tax base is not required from the standpoint of individual initiative, nor does it incur administrative difficulties. At the same time, the credit approach of Kennedy would
have cost us little in terms of erosion, while at the same time
providing a subsidy to those in need with a minimum of paperwork. Of course, such a preference would result, through the sheer
force of equity, in relief for others similarly situated, but if it takes
the form of highest advantage to those with lowest incomes, it
would aid the cause of progression.
An additional benefit to the aged (again, not based on need)
was provided by the House Ways and Means Committee under the
Revenue Act of 1964. Under this provision a taxpayer who is 65 or
over can exclude from gross income gain attributable to the first
$20,000 of the sale price of his residence. The property must have
been owned and used by the taxpayer for 5 of the 8 year period
228
preceding the sale.
Strangely enough this particular preference creates a problem
through the interaction of sections 120 and 1034. The latter section
excludes from recognizable taxable income gains on the sale of a
residence where a new one is purchased within one year, and where
the purchase price of the new exceeds the adjusted sales price of
the old. The reason for the anomaly is that under section 121 the
greater the profit from the sale, the greater the exclusion. And,
under section 1034, the section 121 exclusion is subtracted from the
227
adjusted sales price of the old house.
225. Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act of 1948, 61 HAiRv. L.
REV. 1097, 1103 (1948).
226. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., lst SeeS. 45 (1963); S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 51 (1964). Amending INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 121, 122, 1033 (h), (k), 6012
(c).
227. See Fisher, Regressive Taxation Under IRC Sections 121 and 1034, 47 TAXES 537
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This is an example of a provision that has not been completely
thought through. The broader issue is whether the aged or the blind
should be allowed special preferences through the tax base. Certainly, the present approach, not based on need, is a definite preference. Should we be as quick to challenge a dispensation based
truly on need? For example, would not a credit against taxes
limited to a percentage of $5,000 of income be a comfortable device
to aid the retired and disabled on a simpler basis than direct appropriation.
Even under our present approach we must recognize that the
prime beneficiaries are the lower income groups. Just as the exclusion of social security, railroad retirement, and veteran benefits
most directly aids those with reduced ability to pay, so does the
added exemption, the retirement income credit, and the special
treatment on sale of residences. Consequently, even if the approach
toward the elderly and the blind adopted by Congress is a rough
one, it is reasonable to the extent it is attuned to need. And in reviewing these it would be more realistic to ask that the taxing
committees adjust them based on need, rather than that they abolish
them.
D.

DEDUCTIONS

The need for Congressional re-examination of personal deductions has been suggested by many writers.2 2 8 Surrey points out that
the deduction for taxes entered the law in 1913 without any real
consideration; that the basis for interest deductions (1913) rests
in the thought that personal and business interest are too difficult
to separate; that charitable deductions were installed in 1916 by a
Senate Floor amendment designed to encourage philanthropy in
light of the wartime tax rates; that casualty (1913) is traceable to
the fire and shipwreck allowance in 1867, with "other casualty" and
(1959). The example he gives is
Jones and Smith:

as follows, involving two taxpayers

aged 65 named

Cost--old
Selling price

Jones
$20,000
60,000

Smith
$30,000
60,000

Gain

$40,000

$30,000

§ 121 exclusion

$13,333

$10,000

Purchase price of new

$35,000

$35,000

AdJ. sales price--old

$46,667

$50,000

Rec.

$11,667

$15,000

gain

228. See C. KAH1T, PERSONkL DEDUCTIONS IN THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1960); Pechman, Erosion of the Individual Income Tax, 10 NAkTL. TAX J. 6 (1957) ; TAX REv. COmp.,
supra note 85.
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theft added in 1916; whereas, the medical deduction of 1942 and
the child care provision in 1954 were given greater scrutiny by Congress. 22 9 Since 1954 the allowance for child care has been expanded
281
considerably, 2 0 treatment of moving expense has been codified
and special provisions have been added to benefit political contribu282
tors..
The difficulty Congress faces in repealing these deductions is
illustrated by the Revenue Act of 1964. President Kennedy proposed
that itemized deductions be limited to those in excess of five per
cent of adjusted gross income. 28s This change would have produced
a revenue gain of $2.3 billion annually, and would have simplified
tax reporting for individuals by increasing the use of the minimum
proposal was rejected by the House Ways
standard deduction. 2 " This
22 5
and Means Committee.
The opposition reasoned that a floor under itemized deductions
was as dangerous as a limitation placed on top. Thus it was
argued that the proposal would discourage charitable giving, 28 6 and
homeownership. 2 7 An accountant saw in it a threat to our established American way of life,2 8 and the representative for the United
States Chamber of Commerce reasoned that it was
a prime example of an arbitrary provision that ignores the
taxpayer attributes and confidence . . . it penalizes the conscientious, public-spirited citizen and favors the selfish taxdeduction
payer who is entirely willing to take his standard
2
and contribute nothing to his community needs. 8
In view of this history it is easy to argue that a change
in these areas would upset basic patterns that have been established. 240 Most of the deductions have the sanction of history, becoming a sort of vested right within our system. In this area, therefore,
one can look briefly at the policy reasons sustaining the preference,
but cannot realistically predict their removal.
229.

Surrey,

The

Federal Income

Tax Base for Individuals, TAX

REV.

COMP.,

8altra

note 85, at 9, 10.
230. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 214.
231.
232.

(3).

Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means on the Tax Recommendations
President, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1963).
Id. at 19, 104, 105.
Id. at 18, 104. The proposal was not reported out by the Committee.
Id. at 2533, 2551.
Id. at 1285.
Id. at 2533, 2551.
Id. at 2307.
Congressman Byrnes notes that:
To me these deductions are almost as vital a part of the code as are the
rates.
I think that is why we have to be very careful. It is disturbing that we
are going to upset these basic patterns that have been established.
at 702.

233.
of the
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id.

INT. Rsv. CODE OF 1954, § 217.
INT. RE V. CODE OF 1954. §§ 41, 642 (a)
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Charitable and Political Contributions (48, 39)

Since contributions to charitable organizations are generally deductible, these organizations are financed largely at the expense
of the Federal Treasury. The proportion of the federal contribution
corresponding to tax revenues lost is based on the income tax brackets of the contributors. 24 1 Political contributions, on the other hand,
which operate on the same principle, are a recent innovation to the
Code.2 4 2 This item can be readily understood by all taxpayers to be
an item of preference, and one that substracts from tax revenues
while subsidizing political campaigns. Since it is of recent innovation,
it is not possible to measure the resultant revenue loss. As to contributions generally, however, the loss of revenue is measurable. In
2 4
1970 $12.92 billion dollars were claimed as itemized contributions. 3
To what extent charitable giving patterns are influenced by
the tax allowance is uncertain. Apart from the tax incentive, the
244
wealthy taxpayer is influenced by social custom and pressure.
And, in spite of changes in rates and the installation of the minimum
standard deduction in 1944, those who itemize give a constant average
24 5
of four per cent of their income to charity.
Yet, in spite of this stability in contributions, Congress in 1969
increased the limitation on charitable deductions from thirty to
fifty per cent of adjusted gross income. The justification given,
which will continue to be the policy guide in this area, is summed
up as follows:
In order to strengthen the incentive effect of the charitable
contributions deduction for taxpayers generally . .
It is
believed that the increase in the limitation will benefit taxpayers who donate substantial portions of their income to
charity and for whom the incentive effect of the deduction
is strong-primarily taxpayers in the middle-and-upper-income ranges.2 46
241.
See Rea, Changes in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 Affecting Charitable Organi ations, 27 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 270 (1955). See also Baker, The Tax Treatment of
Charitable Contributions Under the Tax Reform Act of 1969, TUL. TAX INST., 20TH ANN.
327 (1971) ; Morgan. Charitable Contributions Under the Revenve Act of 1964, 19 U.
MTAMI L. REv. 283 (1964).
242. Act of Dec. 10, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 560, provided three income tax
devices designed to provide incentives for aiding the financing of political campaigns.
First, an individual can designate that $1 of his income tax liability ($2 for marriage
filing jointly) be put into an account for use of presidential candidates. Second, an Itemized deduction of up to $50 ($100 jointly) is allowed. And, third, in lieu of the above,
an income tax credit ($12.50 and $25.00) can be claimed to offset tax due on the return.
INT. PRv. COnE OF 1954, §§ 41, 642 (a) (3).
243. Statistics of Income, supra note 205, Table F.
244. The most elaborate analysis of tax incentives as to philanthropic contributions is
made by C. KAHN, PERSONAL DEDUCTIONS IN THE INcoME TAX 46-91 (1960). For his
conclusions as to rate progression and the cost of giving see pages 83-87.
245. Remarks of Stanley S. Surrey, then Asst. Sec. of the Treas. before the Justice Society, Feb. 28, 1963, reprinted in 109 CONG. REc. 3681, 3685 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1963). See
also C. KAHN, supra note 244, at 62.
246. H.R. REp. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1969).
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Whether or not the deduction provides incentive for contribution,
2 47
and ignoring the problem of favoritism to the wealthy contributor,
this is an area where some allocation of funds through the tax
system is preferable to a system funded entirely by direct appropriation. Church support, mentioned above in connection with the
exclusion of rental value of parsonages, is the obvious example
given by Wolfman in that the contribution deduction is less likely
to interfere with free religious exercise than a direct appropriation.
As to colleges, universities, and foundations, stimulation by tax
preference "provides a balance, not a perfect one, but one which
yields security and direction on the expenditure side, while leaving
'248
room for flair, style and creativity on the other.
2.

Taxes (21)

The deductibility of state and local non-business taxes, currently
including most property, sales, income and motor fuel taxes,2 4 9 is
250
justified as a coordinating device between state and federal taxes.
Although the allowance for state taxes tends to decrease progression,
supporters of this deduction argue that it is a means of moderating
inter-area tax differentials, and also that it is a device to induce
states to place a greater reliance on an income tax. In addition it
has the effect of transferring revenue from the federal to the state

level. 251
Historically, the reasoning behind the deduction was the idea
that net income after taxes was the true measure of ability to pay.
Hence, in the earliest income tax acts, even federal income taxes
were deductible. This treatment was changed during World War I
because of the belief that excessive tax rates would result. 252 Today,
the preference provided for states taxes is rationalized on the basis
of coordination. Without the deduction interstate competition might
force a retreat from income taxation by states where the rates
are high. And, as to the deductibility of property, sales, and motor
taxes, there is the problem of discrimination against states
253
without significant income taxes.
This item is the largest among the itemized deductions.
247.
POLICY

248.

See Vickrey, One Economist's View of Philan'throgy, in
54

PHILANTHROPY

AND PUBLIC

(1962).

Wolfman, supra note 212, at 184.

249. The Revenue Act of 1964 eliminated deductions for tobacco and alcohol
driver's licenses, and other selective excises.
250.

In

Kahn, Personal Deductions in

taxes,

the Individual Income Tax, TAX RPv. COMP., supra

note 85, at 939.
251.
See Bridges, Deductibility of State and Local Nonbusiness Taxes under the Federal
Individual Income Tax, 19 NAT'L. TAX J. 1 (1969).
252.
C. KAHN, supra note 244, at 101.
253. Id. VIcKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESsIVE TAXATION 95 (194 5) would encourage such

discrimIhation to promote the state's use of the income tax.
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1970 over $32 billion was removed from the tax base by this preference.2 5 4 It has been established that the increase in state and
local tax revenue as a result of this deduction is considerably
smaller than the resulting revenue loss, but at the same time
it does have the effect of increasing the relative role of state income
taxes, and decreasing that of the sales tax. 255
Undoubtedly, removal of this preference would be unpopular
from the standpoint of the public. It would be regarded as a
tax upon a tax and confiscatory in nature. If states reduced the
role of their regressive taxes: sales and property taxes, and increased
the personal income tax, it could become confiscatory were it
not for the deduction. However, it is apparent that this is not the
case, in that states have not utilized the subsidy.
We have thus the anamolous situation that in the process
of trying to save progressive State rate schedules via deductibility they become in effect less progressive than they
256
might be without deductibility.
3.

Interest (20)

In 1970 non-business interest deductions totaled $23.9 billion. 257
This deduction has been granted since the income tax began, and,
as in the case of real property taxes, has the effect of encouraging
home ownership.
The argument against the interest deduction is based on equity.
The outright owner of a house or personal property is in a better
position than is the renter. Up until 1963 Great Britain cured this
inequity by imputing income to the outright owner based on net
rental value of the owner occupied house.2 58 Our approach of allowing
an interest deduction to an individual Who borrows money to purchase durable goods is designed to put him in the same position
as the outright owner, who in effect borrows from himself. The
result of the preference, however, is to leave the renter of durable
goods in an unfavorable position. He has neither imputed income
from ownership consumption, nor the interest deduction of the borrower-purchaser.
In spite of the inequity that may exist, repeal of this provision
presents serious difficulties. The historical justification for the provision-that it is difficult to distinguish between personal and busi254. Statistics of Income, supra note 205, Table F.
255. Bridges, supra note 251, at 15.
256. Kahn, supra note 250, at 400.
257. Statistics of Income, supra note 205, Table F.
258. With the Finance Act of 1963 Great Britain abandoned the practice of including
the rental value of owner-occupied residences as taxable income.
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ness interest--2 59is still significant. In spite of the introduction of
the itemized deductions in 1944,260 which required that business and
personal interest be separated, the determination is not really crucial
for those who itemize. 261 Nor is it significant for those without business income. However, in the case of a businessman, interest on
a residential loan may qualify as a business deduction if the proceeds
are used for the production of income and interest on a business
loan may be disqualified because the proceeds are used predominantly for personal expenses. 2 2 Another difficulty would be in the
case of an individual whose part-time business is investments. He
has the option of withdrawing personal savings for business purposes,
or of making a personal-business loan instead. It is doubtful that
in these situations true equity could ever be achieved.
Furthermore, the incentive effect of the interest deduction for
the mortgagor home-owner cannot be overlooked. This subsidy encourages home ownership over tenancy. Even though Congress has
with this aspect, it is clear that it is a major
not dealt specifically
2638
obstacle to change.
4. Medical Expenses (49)
Presently, one may deduct medical expenses in excess of three
per cent of adjusted gross income, medical expenses in excess
of one per cent, and one-half the cost of medical insurance2 6 (not in
excess of $150) with no maximum limitation on deductibility. '
The medical expense deduction was added in 1942. At that time
five per cent of the taxpayer's income was excluded from his
medical expense. In addition a ceiling on deductibility was enacted.
The Revenue Act of 1954 reduced the percentage exclusion to its
present form, and retained a limitation on total deduction. For
taxpayers who had reached the age of 65 the percentage limitation
was removed in 1951.265
In connection with the Revenue Act of 1964 it was proposed
that the one per cent floor on drugs be eliminated and that a
four per cent general floor take its place, and further, that the
dollar limitation be removed. The House also attempted to tax
recoveries from medical insurance which exceed expenses (required
259.
260.

See Surrey, supra note 229, at 9.
See Kahn, supra note 250, at 109.

Of course interest deducted from gross income as a business expense reduces ad261.
justed gross income and consequently Increases the medical and charitable contribution
deductions which are tied into adjusted gross income.

262.
263.
264.
billion
265.

See Kahn, supra note 250, at 124.
Id.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 213. Medical deductions claimed for 1970 totaled $10.6
dollars. Statistics of Income, supra note 205, Table F.
Kahn, 8upra note 250, at 126-27.
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only if a prior deduction had been taken), but this was deleted by
the Senate Finance Committee. The only change that came out'
of the Act of 1964 was the elimination of the one per cent floor
2 6
for taxpayers 65 or over.
In 1965 special treatment for the elderly was removed, 267 as was
26 8
the over-all limitation on the amount of the deduction.
The purpose behind the medical deduction may be best understood by reference to the statement of Randolph E. Paul for the
Treasury in 1942:
A deduction should be allowed for extraordinary medical expenses that are in excess of a specified percentage of the
family's net income. The amount allowed under such a deduction should,269however, be limited to some specified maximum amount.
If the purpose is relief of hardship, why was a ceiling placed on the
deduction? On this point the Treasury reasoned as follows:
We do not want to extend this deduction to families with
chronic invalids who spend a great deal of money and perto us
haps enjoy their illnesses. In other words it seemed
270
that $2,500 was a reasonable maximum limitation.
The removal of this maximum limitation for years after 1966 came
about through the elimination of the special provisons for the aged.
The Senate Finance Committee refused to put the percentage limitations back in for the elderly 271 unless the maximum limitation
on deductions was removed. 27 2 This was accepted by the Joint Conference with reservations as to definitional problems:
Removing the ceiling ... may increase the aggregate amount
claimed for deductions [for installation of swimming pools,
air conditioning and transportation expenses]. Therefore,
the conferees . . . recognize the desirability of considering
legislation dealing with
the definition of allowable medical
27 3
expense deductions.
266.

Hearings, supra note 169, at 19, 100; House Report supra note 226, at 56: Senate

at 156; Conference Report, supra note 172, at 22: amending INT.
(b).
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, §§ 106 (a), (b), 79 Stat. 336, amending
§ 213(a),(b).
268.
Act of July 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 106 (d), 79 Stat. 337, repealing INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 213(c).

Report, supra note 226,
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 213
267. Act of July 30,
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,

269.

Revenue Revision of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1612 (1942).

270.

Id.

271.

See S. REP. No. 904, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).

272.

See Sierk. The Medical-Expense Deduction--Past, Present and Future, 17 MERCER

at 1613, 1623.

L .REv.381, 387 (1967).
273. 111 CON. REc. 17540 (daily ed. July 26, 1965).
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Unlike the other personal deductions, the medical expense one
incurs is not regular in nature (unless chronic) nor is it voluntary.
And, with the percentage limitations provided, the amount deducted
must be substantial. In this respect it may be classified as a hardship dispensation. In fact the allowance may be viewed as a social
health insurance scheme, in that in years of illness lower taxes
provide benefits, and in years of health higher taxes provide pre274
miums.
As a result of this, a disparity arises between taxpayers who
voluntarily insure against illness and those who do not. Since the
deduction is limited to unreimbursed medical costs, the uninsured
taxpayer is subsidized. However, this person would normally fall
into the category of lower-income or aged and so any social benefits
provided by the deduction would accrue to those with reduced
ability to pay.
Reform in this area should proceed along the lines suggested
by the Conference Report. Medical expenses should be defined by
Congress to exclude the more elaborate expenditures which provide
personal enjoyment to the family generally, such as swimming
pools and air-conditioning.
5.

Casualty Losses (47)

The deduction for loss of property by casualty has been in the
Code since its inception. This is a somewhat unique deduction in
that investment in non-income producing property if damaged or
destroyed may be utilized to offset taxable income, without any
275
allowance for exhaustion through wear and tear.
As an itemized deduction it is closely aligned with the medical
allowance in that both provisions contemplate a hardship situation.
In addition, the losses claimed in both areas are normally beyond
27
the control of the individual. e
Moreover, both areas raise the question of whether or not
the risk should be assumed by the taxpayer, since insurance is
readily available. In fact this is the strongest argument against
the casualty loss deduction: the risk may be insured against.
274.
Kahn, supra note 250, at 136.
(3)
provides for the deduction. Sections 167
275.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 165 (c)
prevent a depreciation allowance for nonbusiness property. See Rabin,
(1),
(2)
(a)
Casualties and Disaster Loans are Dedudtible: The Do's and Don'ts, U. So. CAL. 16TH
TAX INST. 463 (1964). The inconsistent treatment arises because of lack of imputation
of income. The businessman writes off his depreciable business property as an exhaustion

of capital. Sale or destruction of the asset then records gain or loss based on an asset
adjusted for depreciation. A nonbusiness taxpayer is not charged with imputed income
for the use of his asset, nor is he required to adjust his basis for exhaustion.

On sale,

of course, his loss is personal and non-deductible, but gain is taxable only to the extent
it exceeds cost without allowance for the pleasure of consumption.
276. We are dealing of course with an itemized deduction in excess of $100 per casualty, and as such a provision that gives no relief to the lower-income taxpayer.
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The answer to this is that there are victims of disasters where insurance is not available. The counter-argument that extreme casualties
should be dealt with through direct federal appropriation rather
than through the tax base is answered by the recognition that federal
relief is available only in the case of area disasters and does not
assist the individual loss through fire, flood, or shipwreck.
Richard Epstein277 points out several inconsistencies in this provision. Although he would favor an expanded casualty treatment,
the two major examples that he gives stress the need for insurance
on the part of the taxpayer. First, in a contract setting, if a
taxpayer negligently loses valuable personal property he would not
be entitled to a casualty loss deduction, since losses through neglect
are not contemplated by the provision. If he is uninsured he bears
the loss. If he is insured, however, he is made whole without
tax consequence, and the insurance company gets a deduction as
a legitimate business expense. Hence, the shifting of the loss results
in a deduction.
In a tort setting, involving sudden and unexpected injury to
land, the deduction allows for another questionable result. Assume
that A owns a house in a valley below B which is damaged through
the run-off of water from B's property. If this is a deductible casualty loss, then either A is made whole through recovery from
B or he has a deduction in excess of the $100 floor. But if A does
recover from B the deduction disappears. B cannot claim the loss
because it is attributable to a judgment and as such does not fall
within the enumerated classes of casualty.
In this last example, of course, if B had insured against liability
as an owner the loss would have been shifted to the insurance
company, and a deduction would have resulted. It would seem
that in both examples the injured party should assume the risk
through insurance.
This is clearly an area where at least some tightening up should
be considered. The $100 floor per item of casualty installed by the
Revenue Act of 196478 did much to correct minor abuses and
to eliminate small losses based on the argument of theft, but it is
apparent that a hardship only arises where a costly catastrophe has
occurred. In addition, the value of the deduction to the taxpayer
increases with his tax bracket and is of no benefit to one in
the lower brackets who takes the standard deduction. An alternative
to outright repeal would be to use the medical deduction approach:
Epstein, The Consumption and Loss of Personal Property Under the Internal Reve277.
nue Code, 23 STAN. L. REv. 454 (1971).

278.

The House Ways and Means Committee rejected the proposed 4% floor, and sub-

stituted the $100 limitation. Hearings, supra note 169, at 19, 105; Report, supra note 226,

at 51; Senate Report, supra 226, at 57.
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allow the deduction for casualty losses only to the extent that they
exceed a percentage of adjusted gross income.
6.

Moving Expenses (51)

Prior to 1964, an employee, whether being transferred or going
with a new employer, had a difficult time deducting his moving
2 79
expenses.
On the other hand, if the employer paid the moving
costs involved in transferring an employee, this was not considered
compensatory, and hence not includable in income, while reimbursement of the expenses of a new employee was considered to be com2 80
pensatory in character.
The Revenue Act of 1964 added section 217 to the Code to cure
these inequities. The House Ways and Means Committee reasoned
that treatment at that time discriminated against both new employees and employees who are not reimbursed for moving expenses
by their employers. Further, the Committee felt it was important
to remove deterrents to the mobility of labor to aid in reducing
local structural unemployment. 281 Thus, expenses of moving the employee, members of his household, and household goods became
22
deductible without regard to employment status.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 then added three additional moving
expense deductions: 1) pre-move house hunting trips; 2) temporary
living expenses at the new job location; and 3) certain expenses
incident to a sale, purchase, or lease of a residence. The reasons
given for liberalizing the deduction were identical with those used
in 1964: 1) to equate more fully the treatment of new employees
with that of reimbursed old employees; and 2) to encourage the
mobility of labor. "Moreover, in an important sense, these expenses
' ' 28 3
may be viewed as a cost of earning income.
This latter point emphasizes that this item is an employee
business expense. In this respect it differs from an itemized deduction in that it is deducted from gross income as are other business
expenses284 and thus is available to the taxpayer who takes the
standard deduction.
To the extent that these expenses can be equated with "costs
of earning income" they should continue to be allowed as are other
unreimbursed employee business expenses. This provides a strong
279.

Deductions were disallowed by two Revenue Rulings as being personal in nature.

Rev. Rul. 54-429,

1954-2, CUM.

BULL. 53; Rev. Rul. 55-140, 1955-1, CUM.

BULL.

317. See

Koons v. United States, 315 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1963).
280,. See H.R. 8363, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 58-59 (1963).
281.

282.
283.
284.
bursed

Id. at 59.

INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 217.
H.R. REP. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1969).
INT. 1Rxv. CODE: or 1954, § 162. Note also that § 82 requires inclusion of reimmoving expenses, to prevent a windfall to the taxpayer.
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justification that is not present in the case of a personal deduction,
which is based on other policy considerations. Furthermore, to the
extent this dispensation aids in solving the problem of unemployment, it can be separately justified as a needed incentive device.
7.

Child Care (50)

Section 214 of the Internal Revenue Code allows a deduction
for certain household service and dependent care expenses. The
deduction is available of the taxpayer maintains a household for
a dependent under 15 or any dependent (including spouse) who
is disabled. The dollar amount maximum is $400 per month, with
a limitation on gross income on a scale starting at $18,000.85
The allowance of a deduction for child care entered the Code
in 1954.286 The deduction at that time was limited to $600 for children
under twelve and further restricted the deduction on joint returns
in excess of $4,500. In the 1964 Act, Congress raised the income
limitation to $6,000 and increased the deduction to $900 on care of
children under the age of thirteen.2 17 These provisions reached their
present form under the Revenue Act of 1971, which substantially
liberalized the deduction. Dependent age was raised to include 14
year olds, the maximum deduction was increased to a possible
$4,800, and the income limitation was increased to the extent that
full benefit is available for gross incomes of $18,000 and some
88
benefit available up to $27,600.2
The justifications for this preference are so strong that there
is no real case for its removal.
First of all, it may be easily argued that child care is a business expense. For the housewife with a job, child care expenses
are costs of earning income. This argument, however, was rejected
ih Smith v. Commissioner.289 The Tax Court reasoned that the
expenditure was personal in nature, and further, that a deduction
could not be made for an expense that was a substitute for imputed
nontaxable income, the value of a housewife's services.
In view of the extremely generous treatment now provided
by section 214, it is doubtful that the argument of an ordinary
and necessary business expense will ever be judicially re-examined.
285. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 214. To the extent that income exceeds $18,000 the taxpayer loses 50 cents on the dollar, so that at $27,600 there Is no deduction.
286. For a discussion of the provision at that time see U.S. CONG. & AD. NEWs 4055
(1954).
287. For Jusifications see H.R. REP. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1963).
288. This sliding scale has been present since the Inception of the provision. As to
joint returns the 1954 limitation was $4,500, with a dollar for dollar loss in excess of
that level.
289. Smith v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939), a.f.'d mem., 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir.
1940).
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As such, the dispensation will continue to be subject to congressional
scrutiny and will continue as an itemized deduction rather than
a deduction from adjusted gross 'income.
Congress has not equated the deduction with employee business
expense. Rather this preference is thought of as a job development
deduction:
This job development deduction meets three major needs.
First, it provides a substantial incentive for the employment
of qualified individuals in household service. Accordingly,
it can be expected to give large numbers of individuals who
are now receiving public assistance the opportunity to
perform socially desirable services in jobs which are vitally
needed. At the same time, it will help to remove these individuals from the welfare rolls and reduce the cost of providing public assistance. Second, the new deduction relieves
hardship... Third, the new deduction substantially liberalizes
present law as it affects married couples ....
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But whatever the past justification may have been, this is an area
which is currently sustained in the name of women's liberation.
The reasoning, which is very persuasive, is as follows: American
working wives are predominantly secondary family earners, since
women earn less than their employed husbands, and since their working is often discretionary. And, in view of -the fact that family
income is aggregated, the Code furnishes a strong disincentive for
291
potential or actual secondary family earners.
Of course, the central issue is whether or not dependency care
is an ordinary and necessary employee business expense. If one
concludes that it is, then it should come "off the top" and be available to those who take the standard deduction. If one concludes that
it is a personal expenditure, then the value of the incentive as a tool
to encourage employment of household servants and to fill certain
job shortages must be examined.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In examining twenty-six of the income tax provisions isolated
by Chairman Mills as preferences for individuals, this article has
attempted to explore the history behind the provisions and to test
them against the policy considerations suggested by Eisenstein,
Bittker, and Wolfman.
290. S. REP. No. 92-437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1971).
291. See Blumber, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Tajation of
Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REv. 49 (1971). See also Streuling, The New
Household Service Expense and Dependent Care Expense Deduction: Who Will Benefit,
50 TAXES 589 (1972).
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These considerations are: the politics of taxation; the approach
to reform; and the issue of the suitability of the tax base as a vehicle
for subsidy.
Since the decade of the seventies will see serious examination
of preference items granted by the Code, it is hoped that this article
will serve as a reference for those following and encouraging the
cause of reform.

